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Rescuing Dignitary Torts from the 
Constitution 
Cristina Carmody Tilley† 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern First Amendment doctrine is often celebrated 
for its unflinching protection of speakers—both institutional 
and individual—who are sued for injuries their words inflict. 
But the past fifty years of robust Speech and Press Clause 
jurisprudence threatens to eliminate the rights of individuals 
seeking recourse for dignitary injuries imposed by speakers. 
That result is normatively inconsistent with social values in 
even the earliest legal systems. It dismantles a socially agreed 
convention for peaceful resolution of interpersonal disputes, 
which is crucial to the prevention of violent self-help in 
American society and one of the key functions of intentional 
tort law. Most important, it is not mandated by the text of the 
Constitution itself. 
This article begins by orienting the besieged dignitary 
torts—defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress (IIED)—within a theory of tort 
law that justifies the provision of a state-sanctioned forum for 
adjudication of private disputes. While loss-shifting and 
accident regulation theories have little to offer when evaluating 
the dignitary torts, which are by definition intentional and not 
mere accidents, a recent version of the corrective justice theory 
of torts—civil recourse—suggests that a tort forum is crucial 
for injuries to personality in a way that might not be true for 
injuries to property or body. The article then documents the 
threat to this forum posed by the Supreme Court’s imposition 
of a tort-diminishing theory of the First Amendment from 1964 
to the present. The article suggests that if the Court’s free 
  
 † Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of 
Law; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 1999. Thanks to Andrew 
Koppelman, Martin Redish, and Marshall Shapo for helpful comments on early drafts 
of this piece. 
66 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:1 
speech doctrine continues on its current trajectory, it will force 
the abolition of these torts, in practice if not in theory. 
However, interposition of the Ninth Amendment, which 
prohibits construction of the First Amendment to disparage 
rights “retained by the people,” gives the dignitary torts a 
foothold within the structure of the Constitution. If the dignitary 
torts have arguable parity with the First Amendment, then 
courts are not bound by the Constitutional text to vault speech 
rights over the right to sue for dignitary injuries and therefore 
must account for those dignitary rights when analyzing the 
scope of any First Amendment immunity from common-law 
liability. Various Ninth Amendment theories suggest that the 
set of rights “retained” by the people can be filled with natural 
rights, with rights that are a part of Western law “history and 
tradition,” with state rights recognized at the time of the 
American founding, or with state rights developed consistent 
with constitutional jurisprudence after the founding.  
This article documents the historical development of the 
dignitary torts in order to evaluate whether they fit within any 
of the theories of “retained rights” under the Ninth Amendment. 
Defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress were recognized obliquely in Greek law and 
were recognized explicitly as a monolithic cause of action in 
Roman law. Indeed, the provision of a state-sponsored forum for 
vindicating the dignitary interests invaded by these wrongs 
coincided with the decline in violence in these societies. Even 
after the fall of Rome, independent sovereign states in Europe 
and their colonies in North America continued to recognize the 
dignitary torts, albeit more distinctly in some legal systems than 
in others. By the time of the American founding, defamation was 
explicitly embraced by the common law of the states. Moreover, 
protection of privacy and emotional tranquility interests were 
often smuggled into the pre-ratification common law in the guise 
of defamation actions. In addition, after ratification, these 
dignitary torts developed more fully into freestanding causes of 
action. At the turn of the century, invasion of privacy had begun 
to evolve into an acknowledged tort, and by the mid-twentieth 
century, courts began to embrace IIED. This created a full-
bodied common law of dignitary torts well before the Court’s 
expansion of the First Amendment into the dignitary torts 
arena, starting in 1964. Thus, the article argues that 
defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction are 
entitled to constitutional respect and are protected by the 
Ninth Amendment from intraconstitutional diminishment. A 
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failure to reassert the dignitary torts within the constitutional 
framework, the article concludes, undervalues the prudential 
benefits derived from giving victims of dignitary injury a 
peaceful forum for seeking recourse. A return to self-help—
whether in the form of extrinsic violence or suicide—is a distinct 
possibility if the dignitary torts continue to languish within the 
constitutional scheme. Placing these torts on firm constitutional 
footing is necessary to protecting “the whole man.”1  
After discussing the significance of the dignitary torts in 
Part I and summarizing the history of the Court’s increasingly 
dismissive treatment of these causes of action in Part II, the 
article suggests in Part III that the torts can be rescued from 
irrelevance by applying the Ninth Amendment as a rule of 
construction that governs conflicts between enumerated rights 
and unenumerated but retained rights. This rule would only 
apply to the rights protected by the dignitary torts if they are 
reasonably described as “rights retained” whose constitutional 
status is provided for by the Ninth Amendment. The article 
outlines four Ninth Amendment theories for filling the “rights 
retained”—natural-law rights, rights enshrined in Western 
legal tradition, state-law rights existing at the time of 
ratification, and state-law rights developed post-ratification. 
What follows in Part IV is a brief history of the torts within 
Western law, from Rome through England and the colonial and 
modern American periods. This timeline serves as the basis for 
determining whether reputation, privacy, and emotional 
tranquility are properly described as rights retained. The article 
concludes that these rights were retained under any of the four 
theories and consequently do not automatically lose out to the 
enumerated free speech right when the two clash. Finally, Part 
V of the article proposes a test—borrowed from choice of law 
theory—that could guide courts when deciding which of the two 
conflicting rights, enumerated or unenumerated-but-retained, 
should take priority in a given circumstance. The “comparative 
impairment” test would examine the internal and external 
effects of the competing legal regimes—here, speech protection 
and dignity protection—and select the one whose external 
application would least impair the internal effect of its 
competitor. This test guarantees that the interests served by 
each law would be methodically evaluated within a given set of 
  
 1 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation 
and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 700 (1986) [hereinafter Post, Defamation] 
(quoting anthropologist John Davis). 
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facts, and that neither would be gratuitously disparaged in 
contravention of the Ninth Amendment’s rule of construction.  
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIGNITARY TORTS 
Though a mainstay of American law, scholars cannot 
seem to agree why we have torts.2 Three theories of the purpose 
of tort are in the fore today: first, the theory that tort exists to 
provide compensation for accidental injuries; second, that it 
exists to manage and shift risk; and third, that it provides 
individual corrective justice. Without delving too deeply into 
any of these theories, it is easy to conclude that while the first 
two may be legitimate descriptions of the rationale for 
negligence law, which by definition involves inadequate care in 
response to risk, they do not explain why we allow victims of 
intentional torts to recover. As some torts experts have 
observed, intentional torts such as defamation and invasion of 
privacy have “nothing to do with” negligence law.3 This article’s 
concern is limited to the dignitary torts which are a subset of 
intentional torts. The only one of the current theories that 
takes adequate account of intentional torts is the corrective 
justice model. This may explain why the Supreme Court has 
undervalued the dignitary torts when weighed against speech. 
Throughout the 1900s, scholars grew disenchanted with the 
theory that tort was designed to dole out individual justice—a 
theory based on the view that the state had to monopolize 
violence in order to prevent private attacks when individuals 
felt their rights had been violated.4 
The corrective justice theory of torts has experienced a 
renaissance in the past decade, with one gloss on the concept—
civil recourse theory—taking a leading role. But whether the 
idea of corrective justice is in vogue or not, it is worth 
examining why scholars are so willing to discard as a rationale 
for torts, or at least for the intentional dignitary torts, an idea 
that they substitute for private vengeance. That theory seems 
uniquely suited, and indeed crucial, for the dignitary torts.  
The modern disdain among some scholars for the 
“vengeance prevention” function of tort law seems to reflect 
  
 2 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. 
L. REV. 917, 923-28 (2010); Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 1765, 1772 (2009).  
 3 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 977.  
 4 See Solomon, supra note 2, at 1772.  
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contempt for the feudal societies that responded to private 
warfare with a state-sponsored alternative.5 That function, they 
suggest, has little purchase in a contemporary society more 
concerned with allocating the cost of accidents than with 
preventing already diminishing interpersonal violence.6  
This skepticism does not extend as obviously, however, to 
the intentional dignitary torts of defamation, invasion of privacy, 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The behavior 
underlying these torts does more than inflict property damage or 
even physical injury that the modern man is expected to 
rationally commodify. Instead, it invades an individual’s sense of 
worth and dignity, important values in a relational society.7 As 
one sociologist has said, each “individual must rely on others to 
complete the picture of him of which he himself is allowed to 
paint only certain parts.”8 Thus, violations of the dignitary 
interest are the least susceptible to rational response and the 
most ripe for a state-sponsored diversion of vengeful impulses. 
Scholars have taken up two camps in treating the 
relationship between defamation, invasion of privacy, and 
intentional infliction. Some insist that each of the torts serves 
different interests that dictate different substantive 
requirements and distinct legal treatment.9 Others suggest that 
  
 5 See id. at 1781.  
 6 See id.  
 7 “[I]ndividual personality [is] constituted in significant aspects by the 
observance of rules of deference and demeanor . . . . Violation of these rules can thus 
damage a person by discrediting his identity and injuring his personality. Breaking the 
‘chain of ceremony’ can deny an individual the capacity to become ‘a complete 
man . . . .’” Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in 
the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 963 (1989) [hereinafter Post, Privacy] 
(quoting Erving Goffman, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, in INTERACTION 
RITUAL: ESSAYS ON FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR 47, 51 (1967) [hereinafter Goffman, 
Deference]). Post has observed that despite efforts to distinguish the elements of 
privacy and IIED torts, “the boundary between the two . . . is obscured . . . [because] 
the common law . . . is primarily interested in maintaining the forms of respect deemed 
essential for social life” regardless of what they are called. Id. at 971. 
 8 Id. at 962-63 (citing Goffman, supra note 7, at 47). 
 9 The “separatists” identify wholly distinct interests underlying the torts. 
For instance, Robert Post explains that the interest underlying defamation is 
protection of “reputation,” whereas the interest underlying invasion of privacy is 
protection of “emotions.” Post, Privacy, supra note 7, at 958; Post, Defamation, supra 
note 1, at 691-92. Meanwhile, another scholar defines the right underlying IIED as 
“the individual’s interest in emotional tranquility,” Daniel Givelber, The Right to 
Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 43 (1982), which 
sounds identical to the interest Post claims to be protected by the privacy tort. Further 
complicating this effort to neatly cleave the policy goals of the three torts is Post’s view 
that “reputation” can be conceived of as “property,” “honor,” and “dignity,” at least the 
latter two of which seem to occupy the same ground as “emotional tranquility.” Post, 
Defamation, supra note 1, at 693. 
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all three stem from essentially the same social concerns and 
acknowledge substantial overlap among them.10 Historically, the 
dignitary torts were treated as a unitary cause of action, 
protecting a key component of personal security—namely, 
interests in individual personality.11 The fracturing of this 
interest into distinct torts has marginalized the underlying 
interest they protect. Further, it has incented plaintiffs to 
migrate strategically among the torts depending on which is 
most hospitable to a particular claim in light of increasing 
constitutional constraints. Tracing these branches of dignitary 
tort back to the single trunk they evolved from forces analysts 
to confront the broad scope and historical pedigree of the 
interest involved and the extent to which modern law 
diminishes it. 
In short, defamation, invasion of privacy, and IIED are 
treated in American law as separate torts, and courts strive to 
treat them as doctrinally autonomous. But at the same time, 
they stem from the same basic underlying basket of social 
interests, best summarized as “personality” interests, but taking 
account of reputation, honor, dignity, and emotional tranquility.12  
Encroachment on these personal interests continues as 
a major cause of violence in contemporary America. According 
to psychologist Steven Pinker, “most of what we call crime is, 
from the point of view of the perpetrator, the pursuit of 
justice.”13 According to one well-known statistic, only about one-
tenth of homicides in the United States are committed to 
  
 10 These scholars see the torts as more similar than distinct. As one has 
summarized, “[T]he torts of libel, invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress overlap to a certain degree because all three are aimed either 
exclusively or in part at redressing mental suffering.” Robert E. Drechsel, Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Tort Liability for Mass Media, 89 DICK. L. REV. 339, 
350 (1985). Early in the development of privacy and IIED law, one early scholar went so 
far as to suggest that the three should all be melded into a single tort “to constitute a 
single, integrated system of protecting plaintiff’s peace of mind against acts of the 
defendant intended to disturb it.” John W. Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 
VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1125 (1962). This result would have replicated the approach of the 
Roman law from centuries ago, where all three torts—defamation, IIED, and invasion of 
privacy—were recognized and developed under the single heading of iniuria. See infra 
Part IV.A.2 for a discussion of Roman law and iniurial liability. 
 11 See infra Part IV.A.  
 12 Notably, Congress appeared to reach the conclusion that the three torts 
can in effect be interchangeable, defining “defamation” in its recently passed libel 
tourism bill to include “forms of speech [that] are false, have caused damage to 
reputation or emotional distress, have presented any person in a false light, or have 
resulted in criticism, dishonor or condemnation of any person.” Securing the Protection 
of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage (SPEECH) Act, 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 4101(1) (West 2011). 
 13 STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE 83 (2011). 
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achieve a premeditated goal—such as killing a burglary victim 
or police officer in order to complete or hide a crime.14 “The most 
common motives for homicide are moralistic: retaliation after 
an insult, escalation of a domestic quarrel, punishing an 
unfaithful or deserting romantic partner, and other acts of 
jealousy, revenge, and self-defense.”15 Local cultures that draw 
a wider boundary around personal dignity also see more 
violence in response to affronts. For instance, according to 
Pinker, “the American South is marked by . . . a culture of 
honor[,] . . . [which only sanctions violence as] retaliation after 
an insult or other mistreatment.”16  
Thus, torts whose essence is the affront to personal 
honor are more likely to incite vengeance. If so, the provision of 
a state-sponsored forum for resolution as a substitute for that 
violent self-help remains a legitimate purpose for tort law.17  
The dignitary torts, then, are not just or even primarily 
a means to a money judgment. The availability of a forum for 
community adjudication of local norms of interpersonal 
  
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 99; see also William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 
40, 46 (1956) [hereinafter Prosser, Insult and Outrage] (noting that Mississippi, 
Virginia, and West Virginia had historically sanctioned “antidueling codes” in an effort 
to tamp violence that arose from insult). 
 17 To be sure, failure to provide a state-sponsored forum for vindicating 
dignitary interests may have other negative consequences, such as a reluctance to run 
for public office because of the constitutionally mandated forfeiture of self-protective 
legal recourse by candidates and public officials. On a smaller, but equally anti-
democratic, scale, shrinking the dignitary torts may lead even private individuals to 
opt out of public or private speech that could result in incompensable injuries. For 
instance, a class of plaintiffs recently challenged Facebook’s practice of transforming 
pictures and comments of users who “liked” sponsored stories on specific products into 
“endorsement” ads for the products. Somini Sengupta, So Much for Sharing His “Like,” 
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A1. To avoid being featured in a potentially embarrassing 
endorsement, users had to refrain from “liking” a product. Notably, in response to the 
suit, Facebook initially argued that all such users were “public figures” to their friends. If 
so, then under the test for defamation liability set forth in New York Times v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964), Facebook would not have been liable for any dignitary torts under 
current First Amendment law unless it acted with intent or reckless disregard—a 
complex standard to apply to ads generated by algorithm. Facebook has since settled and 
is modifying its endorsement practices. Somini Sengupta, To Settle Lawsuit, Facebook 
Alters Policy for Its Like Button, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2012, at B2, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/22/technology/to-settle-suit-facebook-alters-policies-for-
like-button.html. The pre-modification result—discouraging Facebook users from 
speaking out in favor of a product or issue in order to avoid a dignitary invasion—is a net 
reduction in speech brought about by precisely the standards in current First 
Amendment law meant to increase speech. Justice White predicted just this turn of 
events in his dissent from the majority opinion in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 400 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (“It is not at all inconceivable that virtually 
unrestrained defamatory remarks about private citizens will discourage them from 
speaking out and concerning themselves with social problems.”). 
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behavior, and the possibility of public opprobrium against the 
defendant who invaded the dignity of the plaintiff, is a 
substantial portion of the recourse provided by this area of law. 
This is true whether or not money is ultimately awarded. 
Indeed, one study revealed that many defamation plaintiffs 
would have accepted an apology from the defendants they 
eventually sued, and they would have sought money damages 
only when the defendants refused to express remorse for their 
actions.18 The Court’s erosion of these torts’ potency, described 
below, therefore has a significant impact on both the legal 
treatment of individuals and community control of local norms 
in American law. 
II. DIGNITARY TORTS AND THE COURT 
The past half century of First Amendment development 
is poised to vitiate the role of the dignitary torts in vindicating 
personality interests. In the latter half of the twentieth century, 
the Court handed down a series of opinions that essentially 
constricted the state common law of defamation in order to 
accommodate First Amendment speech goals. The first and most 
celebrated of these cases, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,19 
devised a test to identify the common-law claims that fell under 
the canopy of First Amendment protection. According to the 
Court, if the plaintiff was a public official and the speaker 
published with less than “‘actual malice’ . . . knowledge . . . or 
reckless disregard” of the likelihood the speech was false, 
defendant liability is unconstitutional.20 Notably, in Sullivan and 
subsequent cases, the Court departed from its usual practice of 
simply invalidating a common-law precept or jury verdict and 
remanding for further development at the state court level. 
  
 18 THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 25 (Everette E. 
Dennis & Eli M. Noam eds., 1989). 
 19 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Sullivan on its own did 
not necessarily spell the trivialization of dignitary interests or the proportionally 
greater likelihood of resort to self-help developed later in the article, as its scope was 
limited to suits by public officials. Public officials are among those least likely to batter 
their attackers. But Justice Scalia’s arguably obscene gesture to a reporter in 2006 and 
the attack of Rep. Robert Etheridge (D-N.C.) on a camera-wielding protester in 2010 
suggest that no class of would-be plaintiff is immune from vengeful impulses. See 
Justice Scalia’s Under-the-Chin Gesture, NPR.ORG (Mar. 30, 2006), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5312065; Jeff Zeleny, Etheridge, 
Caught on Video, Apologizes, N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS BLOG (June 14, 2010, 2:20 PM), 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/etheridge-caught-on-video-apologizes. 
Still, Sullivan was the beachhead that led to the current situation.  
 20 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-88. 
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Instead, it repeatedly crafted tort rules of decision to be applied 
as a matter of constitutional law.21 Thus, “after twenty-five years 
and twenty-seven [cases] . . . defamation law was effectively 
disabled, at least in the sphere of public affairs . . . .”22 
Specifically, from 1964 until 1991, the Court replaced a system 
wherein each of the fifty states was free to allow recovery for 
defamation under its own common law—allocating its own 
burdens of proof, standards of review, and the like—with a 
system in which the Constitution ostensibly requires that: 
To recover for libel or slander, a public official must prove that the 
defendant acted with actual malice. Elected officials, candidates for 
public office, and appointed officials who have or appear to the public 
to have substantial responsibility for or control over governmental 
affairs must be treated as public officials. The same rules apply to 
public figures, and anyone who is involved in the resolution of 
important public questions, or who by reason of his or her fame 
shapes events in areas of concern to society, is treated as a public 
figure. To prove actual malice, the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant knew the defamatory statement was false, or had serious 
doubts about its truth. That must be shown by clear and convincing 
proof, and each reviewing court must subject a finding of actual 
malice to independent review instead of the normal clearly erroneous 
standard. Private persons who are not public figures but who are 
defamed in connection with matters of public concern must meet all 
the preceding requirements in order to recover presumed or punitive 
damages but may recover for actual injury by showing that the 
defendant was negligent. All of the preceding types of plaintiffs must 
bear the burden of proving that the defamatory statement is false. 
States may not permit recovery for rhetorical hyperbole, statements 
that cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts about 
the plaintiff, or deliberate misquotation that does not materially 
alter the meaning, and those determinations are to be made as a 
matter of law rather than left to juries.23  
As a result of this constriction, defamation plaintiffs 
have migrated to other tort theories to vindicate their interests. 
One 1985 study observed a spike in intentional infliction claims 
against the media beginning in the 1970s, just as the Court’s 
drive to “disable” defamation law gained momentum.24 Evidence 
suggests that, after Sullivan, claims for invasion of privacy also 
jumped.25 The full-scale diversion of defamation to privacy torts 
  
 21 David A. Anderson, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 BROOK. 
L. REV. 755, 784-87 (2004). 
 22 Id. at 776. 
 23 Id. at 787-88 (footnotes omitted). 
 24 Drechsel, supra note 10, at 346.  
 25 Anderson, supra note 21, at 776-77 (“[A]s long as other tort theories 
remain available, plaintiffs will try to shift their claims into those . . . categories . . . . A 
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may have been thwarted by a 1967 holding suggesting that 
Sullivan applied to privacy claims.26 
The Court initiated its overhaul of the dignitary torts by 
recalibrating defamation, but the movement has gained 
momentum significantly in recent years as it has begun its 
assault on IIED. The Court now appears poised to shrink the 
refuge that IIED provides for dignitary injuries by diminishing 
the intentional infliction tort, again to accommodate a generous 
interpretation of First Amendment imperatives. 
In Hustler v. Falwell,27 the Court determined that public 
figure IIED plaintiffs cannot recover against defendants when 
injury is inflicted via publication unless they meet the Sullivan 
test by proving that something in the publication was false and 
that the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the 
possibility of falsehood.28 The Court explained that standards 
considered constitutionally uncontroversial throughout the 
balance of tort law, such as liability premised on the 
defendant’s bad motive, had to give way in the intentional 
infliction tort in cases where the injury was inflicted against a 
public person via speech.29  
In 2011, the Court expanded this reasoning. In Snyder 
v. Phelps,30 it held that even private figures suing non-media 
speakers for IIED cannot prevail when the speaker inflicts 
injury with speech on public issues. Importantly, the Court 
failed to apply even the minimally tort-protective standard it 
had announced in Falwell, where the actual malice test was 
imported to IIED claims. Snyder appeared to snuff out any 
  
rash of claims for intrusion and related torts in the 1980s and 1990s was widely 
thought to be the result of the increasing difficulty of recovering for defamation.”); cf. 
CLARENCE JONES, WINNING WITH THE NEWS MEDIA 359 (2005). 
 26 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). Though the Sullivan idea of 
balancing tort against speech may broadly apply to privacy claims, the use of culpable 
falsehood as a fulcrum is not an obvious fit for the privacy torts. Although the invasion 
of privacy in Hill took the form of a “false light” claim where misrepresentation was an 
element of the tort, accuracy is irrelevant to the three other privacy torts—public 
disclosure of private facts, right of publicity claims, and invasion of privacy. If 
falsehood is not an element of a dignitary tort, the speaker’s culpability for circulating 
false speech has no utility to distinguish between protected and unprotected speech.  
 27 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). As in Hill, using the 
culpability for falsehood to distinguish between protected and unprotected speech in 
the IIED context is a clumsy tool. Although the speech in Hustler was untrue satire 
and thus susceptible to a Sullivan test, much IIED speech, such as creditor threats or 
disrespect of the dead, will be injurious but not necessarily false. In those cases, the 
test does not help distinguish between speech that merits First Amendment protection 
and speech that is unprotected.  
 28 Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56.  
 29 Id. at 53. 
 30 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
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tort–speech balance by neglecting the actual malice test 
altogether. The speech at issue in Snyder was a funeral protest 
with picket signs that arguably suggested, among other things, 
that the deceased was a homosexual.31 The protestors 
presumably circulated this false statement of fact knowingly or 
recklessly. The Court did not apply the Sullivan actual malice 
rule—which was adapted to IIED in Falwell—to permit 
recovery despite the fact that the protestors’ speech arguably 
contained knowing falsehoods about a private person.32 
Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, described the case’s 
stark conceptual choice as a clash between First Amendment 
values and the state interest in protecting its citizens via 
common-law tort.33 As Breyer summarized, the Court concluded 
that the speech interest in the case trumped the individual 
emotional interest without using the actual malice test.34 The 
Court’s silence on actual malice in the Snyder case amounted to 
a facial decision that speech trumps tort regardless of the 
precise speech or activity involved—a decision that takes the 
Court even further down the anti-tort path it staked out in 1964.  
Writing several years before Snyder, David Anderson 
predicted that if the First Amendment were interpreted to 
require that tort law impose absolutely no burdens on truthful 
speech touching a matter of public concern, the eventual result 
  
 31 Id. at 1225 (Alito, J., dissenting). Some of the other signs, held aloft near 
the church funeral for deceased soldier Matthew Snyder, read “God Hates You,” “You’re 
Going to Hell,” and “Thank God for Dead Soldiers.” Snyder’s father, the plaintiff, 
claimed that the signs and the consequent news coverage resulted in his depression 
and physical illness, and prevented him from recalling his son without thinking of the 
picketers. Id. at 1213-14 (majority opinion). 
 32 To be sure, application of the actual malice rule in Snyder might have 
resulted in a finding that the speech interest was weightier than the dignitary interest 
represented by the tort. In fact, the outcome of the case is consistent with this 
reasoning. What is notable, however, is the Court’s neglect of the standard and its 
automatic assumption that speech trumped tort without any analytical consideration of 
the competing interests. See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219-20 (“What Westboro said, in the 
whole context of how and where it chose to say it, is entitled to ‘special protection’ 
under the First Amendment, and that protection cannot be overcome by a jury finding 
that the [speech] was outrageous. . . . As a Nation we have chosen . . . to protect even 
hurtful speech on public issues . . . .”). 
 33 Id. at 1221-22 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 34 Id. at 1221; see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps, 
Outrageousness, and the Open Texture of Tort Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473, 490 (2011) 
(discussing the benefits of applying the actual malice test to both public and private 
figures suing for IIED inflicted via speech on matters of public concern, citing Eugene 
Volokh’s argument along these lines found, inter alia, at Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Tort, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. 
DE NOVO 300, 304 (2010)). 
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would be abolition of “tort liability . . . arising from that category 
of speech.”35 Snyder seems to make good on that prediction.  
Comparing the status of state common-law torts prior to 
Sullivan and post-Snyder leads to one conclusion: the Court is 
steadily shrinking the province of tort law that protects 
dignitary interests and inversely expanding the reach of First 
Amendment speech protections. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR HONORING DIGNITARY 
TORTS 
The First Amendment’s encroachment upon the 
dignitary torts is often justified by observing that, although the 
basket of dignitary interests is valuable as a matter of social 
policy, the Framers drafted a Constitution that vaults speech 
above those interests.36 
The resolution of the dignity-versus-speech question 
may, however, require more than facile recourse to the First 
Amendment. The Framers constructed a preemptive textual 
counterweight to the First Amendment in the Ninth 
Amendment, which prohibits the denial or disparagement of 
“rights retained by the people” in favor of rights enumerated in 
the Constitution.37 Several theories of the Ninth Amendment 
  
 35 Anderson, supra note 21, at 777. 
 36 See, e.g., Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220 (“[W]e cannot . . . punish[] . . . the 
speaker. As a Nation we have chosen . . . to protect even hurtful speech on public issues 
to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.” (emphasis added)). 
 37 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Ninth is the only explicit repository for these 
rights. But the document as a whole reinforces the view that the dignitary torts are not 
shut out of its scope. First, as many have observed, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments 
can be said to work in tandem, with the Ninth specifying that the people retained the 
set of unenumerated rights and the Tenth giving them the right to “confer powers upon 
their state governmental agents” in furtherance of those rights, among other ends. 
CALVIN MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION’S 
UNENUMERATED RIGHTS 107 (1995); see also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (observing that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments together 
recognize the value of individual dignity and the role of the states in providing a forum 
for its vindication).  
  Second, both the original public understanding of the First Amendment 
and several normative theories of free expression suggest that the First Amendment, 
on its own terms, accounts for dignitary interests. For instance, many 
contemporaneous accounts of the adoption of the First Amendment suggest that its 
primary goal was to thwart central government efforts to restrain speech via criminal 
libel statutes or licensing schemes, see, e.g., Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the 
First Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1156, 1176 (1986), not to thwart individual 
citizens seeking recourse from other individuals whose words injured them, with a 
community cross-section of jurors setting intracommunity norms as to the 
reasonableness of particular types of speech. The existence of defamation actions at the 
time the First Amendment was adopted is often seen as “freezing” the balance between 
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suggest that the rights protected by the dignitary torts may be 
among those “retained by the people” and thus shielded from 
disparagement relative to those enumerated in the Constitution.  
The Ninth Amendment is often derided as no more than 
a “punchline”38 or an “inkblot,”39 and the Supreme Court has not 
relied on it as the basis for any line of decisions.40 Still, 
constitutional scholars seem convinced that it must stand for 
something, and they have focused for the past two decades on 
various theories that would give it meaning.41 Most of these 
theories suggest that “rights retained” have status as 
independent constitutional rights, thus playing the same 
judicially enforceable “oversight” role with regard to state or 
federal law as do the enumerated constitutional rights.42 If these 
theories are correct, the composition of “rights retained” is 
crucial and politically charged, since these rights could serve as 
the basis for striking down legislation. Perhaps because the 
stakes under these theories are so high, and because scholars of 
different political camps are wary of ceding policy ground, there 
  
speech and reputation as it stood at the time of ratification. See id. Moreover, even 
modern First Amendment theory suggests a place for the dignitary rights as a subset of 
expressive rights. For example, to the extent that the purpose of the First Amendment 
is to foster “self-realization,” via “individual choice and intellectual development,” that 
purpose is served by allowing individuals to vindicate privacy rights absent which they 
might not engage in particular intellectual endeavors. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 5 (1984). The same protection for 
privacy can be derived from, among others, a “liberty model” of free speech, where 
expression is protected if it “defines, develops, or expresses the self.” See id. at 49 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing the work of Edwin Baker). As one 
writer has summarized, “the same principles that underlie freedom of expression also 
give rise to other rights, such as personal security, privacy [and] reputation.” Steven J. 
Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom 
of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1280 (1998). In short, the Ninth Amendment 
argument for acknowledging the rights represented by the dignitary torts is not a 
constitutional outlier, but in fact is consistent with the document read as a whole. 
 38 Jeffrey Jackson, The Modalities of the Ninth Amendment: Ways of 
Thinking about Unenumerated Rights Inspired by Philip Bobbitt’s Constitutional Fate, 
75 MISS. L.J. 495, 496 n.1 (2006) [hereinafter Jackson, Modalities]. 
 39 Ryan C. Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of Construction, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 498, 500 & n.1 (2011). 
 40 Jackson, Modalities, supra note 38, at 496. 
 41 See KURT LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 304-05 
(2009) (explaining that Justice Reed suggested in United Public Workers of America 
(CIO) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), that the amendment merely reinforced the idea 
that the states retained all powers not enumerated in the Constitution, not that it 
identified independent rights that could be asserted to contest the exercise of a federal 
power). More recently, leading theorists have taken different views, such as Randy 
Barnett’s position that the amendment is a freestanding source of individual rights, 
and Kurt Lash’s contention that it is a limitation on federal government power to 
override “the people’s” right to local self-government. Williams, supra note 39, at 506-
08 & n.41 (outlining these and other well-known theories).  
 42 Williams, supra note 39, at 505-06. 
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has been little agreement as to the content of the “rights 
retained.”43  
In recent years, a more modest theory of the Ninth 
Amendment has emerged. That theory holds that the provision is 
not an independent source of constitutional rights but rather a 
rule of construction that governs when unenumerated-but-
retained rights clash with enumerated rights.44 The retained rights 
are not judicially enforceable in the sense that they can be used to 
strike down popular legislation. Instead, the Ninth Amendment 
directs that retained rights cannot be assigned categorical second-
class status when they conflict with enumerated rights. Courts 
need not “enforce” retained rights as they would enumerated 
rights, but their interpretation of enumerated rights must not 
automatically crowd out the rights retained.45  
Although this theory does not create a new class of 
judicially enforceable constitutional rights, it still requires 
identification of the rights “retained” under the Amendment. 
The underlying proposals for filling out the set of “rights 
retained” are identical regardless of the structural role 
assigned to them under the different Ninth Amendment 
theories. Four such theories have been identified in Ninth 
Amendment literature: “natural-law” rights as originally 
publicly understood by the Framers; rights deemed “natural” 
by virtue of their deep roots in Western and American legal 
  
 43 Id. This development is not surprising, given that the revival in Ninth 
Amendment interest followed Justice Goldberg’s concurrence in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Justice Goldberg pointed to the Ninth 
Amendment as a source of judicial authority to enforce “fundamental” individual rights 
infringed by state laws, such as Connecticut’s ban on birth control.). Not only did 
Goldberg propose a potent role for the Ninth Amendment, but he did it in a case 
fraught with controversial policy implications. Among the general structural theories of 
the Ninth Amendment are those suggesting that it merely reaffirms the limitations on 
federal government powers by barring the implication that carving out individual 
rights in the Bill of Rights allowed expansion of federal power anywhere beyond the 
carve-out, see, e.g., Laurence Claus, Protecting Rights from Rights: Enumeration, 
Disparagement, and the Ninth Amendment, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 587-88 
(2004), and those reaching the opposite conclusion that the language reserves space for 
the expansion of individual constitutional rights protected from federal government 
reach, see Williams, supra note 39, at 505-06. 
 44 Claus, supra note 43, at 592. Other rules of construction have also been 
suggested, including a rule that non-enumeration does not foreclose the position that a 
right may be within an enumerated right, see, e.g., MASSEY, supra note 37, at 11 
(summarizing the view of Laurence Tribe), or that retained rights are not elevated to a 
constitutional level, but keep the same status they had historically regardless of the 
fact that some other rights were enumerated within the Constitution, see, e.g., 
Williams, supra note 39, at 530. 
 45 Claus, supra note 43, at 617-18. 
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tradition; state-law rights at the time of ratification; and state-
law rights post-ratification.  
A. Natural-Law Rights as Originally Publicly Understood 
by the Framers 
The “natural-law rights” theory of the Ninth 
Amendment suggests that any right understood at the time of 
ratification to belong to individuals, as distinct from rights 
derived from membership in a centrally governed society, was 
among those “‘rights retained’ by the people.”46 The Ninth 
Amendment’s use of the phrase “rights retained” is “the 
language of Lockean social compact theory.”47 Under Lockean 
theory, all human beings have rights in the state of nature, 
including the right to “ownership of one’s own body and the 
product of one’s labors, [as well as] . . . the right to use 
violence . . . [in retaliation when] others” violate those natural 
rights.48 The delegates to the Constitutional Convention, in 
drawing a constitution, decided which “natural rights” to 
relinquish to a central government to achieve a “common good,” 
and which to retain.49 Examples of such retained rights might 
be the right to travel, the right to pursue a job, the right to self-
defense, or even, as some of the Framers joked during debates 
over ratifying the Bill of Rights, “the right to wear a hat, and to 
go to bed when one pleases.”50 Notably, the founding generation 
viewed individual rights and government powers as mutually 
exclusive; that is, “rights began where powers ended, and 
  
 46 Jeffrey Jackson, Blackstone’s Ninth Amendment: A Historical Common 
Law Baseline for the Interpretation of Unenumerated Rights, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 167, 
170-71 (2010) [hereinafter Jackson, Blackstone]. 
 47 Michael W. McConnell, The Ninth Amendment in Light of Text and 
History, 2009-2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 13, 15 (2010).  
 48 Id. at 16. 
 49 Id. at 15-16 (quoting Brutus, On the Lack of a Bill of Rights, in THE 
COMPLETE FEDERALIST AND ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 749, 750 (2009), and explaining 
that some natural rights were relinquished to the central government, while others 
were retained by individuals).  
 50 Id. at 17-18. Notably, some have suggested that the Ninth Amendment 
also protects the right of citizens to collectively adopt state and local policies. Id. at 17 
n.17 (citing Kurt Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 895 (2008)). This view of the Ninth Amendment is one reason it is often paired 
with the Tenth, which seems to protect the rights of “the people” as a collective entity. 
LASH, supra note 41, at 90. To the extent that dignitary torts are creatures of state 
statute or common law, they may also be considered within the protections offered by 
the Tenth Amendment as well as the Ninth. See, e.g., MASSEY, supra note 37, at 75 
(explaining that both amendments stemmed from a single original proposal, which 
simultaneously shielded rights and limited federal government powers). 
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powers began where rights ended.”51 The failure to grant 
government a power necessarily implied that the inverse 
individual right was retained, so that rights need not be 
explicitly enumerated in the constitutional text. But once 
enumeration of rights within the Bill of Rights became 
inevitable, it became obvious that the Framers could not 
enumerate every right they might wish individuals to retain. 
The Ninth Amendment is viewed by some as a solution to the 
necessarily incomplete enumeration given in the Bill of Rights, 
serving as a general placeholder for natural-law rights that the 
Framers did not intend to relinquish but had not thought 
specifically to enumerate.52 Thus, if dignitary rights were among 
the natural-law rights designed to be “retained” by the Framers, 
they fit within the Ninth Amendment rule of construction and 
need not take a back seat to enumerated rights. The Framers 
looked to two primary sources to determine the scope of natural-
law rights: the theories of John Locke and the English 
constitutional and common law as found within Blackstone’s 
Commentaries.53 Those theories are discussed in the historical 
review of the dignitary torts given in Part IV. 
B. Rights Embedded in Western Legal Tradition 
A broader and less well-developed version of the 
“natural-law” theory of rights retained contends that they are 
those within the “history and traditions of our national 
  
 51 MASSEY, supra note 37, at 67. This perspective is vastly different from the 
modern view, which tends to view rights as “trumping governmental powers.” Id. One 
reason that the values underlying dignitary torts have so withered may be that tort 
law evolved from a system designed to vindicate “rights” to one designed to manipulate 
“interests” to achieve efficient policy ends. Thus, tort law values were “rights” at the 
time of the founding, capable of exerting equal and opposite pressure on the 
enumerated “right” of free speech. By the time of Sullivan, however, tort law values were 
mere “interests” to be achieved by the use of state government power, which would be 
trumped by the free speech “right” inherent in the First Amendment. See, e.g., Kenneth J. 
Vandevelde, A History of Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a General Theory of Intentional 
Tort, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 456-62 (1990) (summarizing the struggle between two 
leading American torts scholars, Thomas Cooley and Oliver Wendell Holmes, where 
Cooley aligned with Blackstone in advocating that tort law was “a series of remedies for 
invasions of . . . rights,” while Holmes argued that tort liability is a function of “public 
policy, rather than subjective moral fault.”). Steven Heyman has observed that when the 
First Amendment was adopted, free speech rights were part of a natural-law fabric, and 
thus were considered “bounded by the rights of others,” so that government was obliged 
not just to protect speech but to “ensure that this liberty was not used to violate other 
fundamental rights.” Heyman, supra note 37, at 1279. 
 52 MASSEY, supra note 37, at 70-74. 
 53 Jackson, Blackstone, supra note 46, at 171.  
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experience.”54 A “historical” view of retained rights does not 
depend on “the absence []or presence of positive law bearing 
upon a particular claimed right,” but instead requires a 
longitudinal examination of the “traditions from which 
[American law] developed as well as the traditions from which 
it broke,” and their ongoing evolution.55 Part IV provides a 
detailed historical examination of the Western legal traditions 
from which American law developed, documenting their deep-
seated roots and historical status, from Greek and Roman law 
through Anglo-Saxon and English common law. 
C. State Rights—at Ratification and After Ratification 
The “state rights” theory of the Ninth Amendment 
suggests that the “rights retained” for Ninth Amendment 
purposes are the rights “derived from state law,” including 
state constitutions, statutes, and common law.56 Some versions 
of the “state rights” view suggest that the relevant rights are 
those that were in existence at the time of ratification.57 Others, 
in contrast, suggest that rights recognized or created by the 
states after ratification come within the “rights retained” 
umbrella so long as they were not unconstitutional when 
adopted.58 As one article has summarized, under the “state 
rights” theory, “the ninth amendment . . . preserves rights 
existing under state laws already ‘on the books’ in 1791 plus 
those rights which the states would thereafter see fit to 
enact.”59 The development of the American law of dignitary 
torts within state constitutions, statutes, and common law is 
traced in Part IV below.60  
Under any of these plausible theories of the Ninth 
Amendment,61 the evisceration of the dignitary torts becomes a 
  
 54 Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment, 
61 U. CIN. L. REV. 49, 100 (1992).  
 55 Id. at 100-01. 
 56 Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 
VA. L. REV. 223, 259 (1983). 
 57 Id. at 248; Claus, supra note 43, at 595, 620-21.  
 58 Claus, supra note 43, at 595, 620-21. 
 59 Caplan, supra note 56, at 248, 263.  
 60 See infra Part IV.B. 
 61 These models by no means exhaust the various approaches taken to define 
the “rights retained” by the people in the Ninth Amendment. Others include the 
residual rights theory, the collective rights model, and the federalism model. See, e.g., 
Randy Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11-21 
(2006) (summarizing theories). It is beyond the scope of this article to test the dignitary 
torts within each of these models; the point of the article is that recourse to the First 
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more complicated constitutional matter than mere application 
of the First Amendment. It requires an assessment of whether 
the rights protected by the dignitary torts—reputation, dignity, 
privacy, and emotional tranquility—can be identified as 
natural-law rights, as rights deeply rooted within Western 
legal history and tradition, or as state-created rights either in 
1791 or at any time between the ratification and the Court’s 
first assault on the dignitary torts in 1964.62 If so, they must at 
least be accounted for in the constitutional calculus, even if the 
ultimate decision is to accord them less weight through a test 
that “optimal[ly] accommodat[es]” between dignitary and 
speech interests.63 But if the dignitary interests are accounted 
for and then balanced, their normative appeal need not be 
discounted as constitutionally insignificant, which is a 
tendency that appears throughout the First Amendment cases 
involving speech torts.64 
IV. THE HISTORIC PEDIGREE OF THE DIGNITARY TORTS—
ANCIENT AND MODERN 
Evaluating the status of the personality interests as 
“rights retained” under any of the foregoing theories requires 
placing them on a timeline. Only then can one determine 
whether they are natural rights as understood by the Founders 
at the time of ratification, rights developed through a 
longstanding tradition of Western legal culture from which 
American law developed, rights created by state law at the 
time of ratification, or rights created by state law post-
ratification. This section briefly recounts the ancestry of each 
tort within the Western legal tradition underlying American 
  
Amendment is not sufficient to justify speech preference every time a speech right 
clashes with a dignitary right. That the dignitary rights have some constitutional heft 
within at least some theories of the Ninth Amendment undermines the mechanistic 
response of those who consistently choose speech by arguing that they have no other 
constitutional choice. 
 62 Attempting to draw inviolate lines between these theories is futile, as even 
scholars in different camps often seem to acknowledge that the ideas overlap and have 
been used interchangeably. See, e.g., Suzannah Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 171, 216 (1992-93) (stating that Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Century 
American lawyers thought that state constitutions “merely reflect[ed] natural law”).  
 63 Claus, supra note 43, at 618; see infra notes 193-97, 224 and accompanying text. 
 64 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011); see also Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 369-72 (1974) (White, J., dissenting at length based 
on the view that the ongoing constitutionalization of defamation had wiped out the 
states’ ability to protect reputational interests). For a discussion of Snyder v. Phelps, 
see Part II, supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text. 
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law. The canvass moves from Greek and Roman law, where the 
torts were originally viewed as a broad unitary cause of action; 
to Anglo-Saxon law, which also recognized personality interests 
generally; and finally to the Elizabethan and modern English 
systems, where more differential treatment was given to these 
interests, but where courts over time seemed willing to 
compensate for an infringement on each dignitary interest.  
A. Ancient Law  
Western tort law is a direct descendant of the law of 
delict conceived in ancient Greece and Rome.65 The law of early 
Greece began to mature before the law of Rome, and the 
writing of Greek poets and philosophers summarizing Greek 
legal theory was well known in the Roman world, which 
developed a sophisticated legal system over several centuries.66 
The ancient Greek culture had a significant, if indirect, impact 
on the development of Western law.  
1. Greece 
Prior to the written codification of law in Greece—
commonly registered at 621 BC with the first Greek written 
legal code, the Code of Draco—evidence of the development of 
Greek law can be found in works of literature and philosophy, 
and later in unwritten customary law.67 Even the earliest of 
these sources reveal that dignitary slights accomplished by 
speech and conduct were considered ripe for private civil 
adjudication in large part because they were likely to provoke 
violence. For instance, the poet Hesiod, who described the 
norms in existence in the seventh and sixth centuries BC, 
wrote that slander and libel were considered delicts: “A man 
owns no better treasure than a prudent tongue; . . . Bad words 
flung at others bounce back with double strength.”68 Moreover, 
  
 65 M. Stuart Madden, The Graeco-Roman Antecedents of Modern Tort Law, 44 
BRANDEIS L.J. 865, 909 (2006). 
 66 Id. at 865. “[A]lthough laws and legal procedures were known in various 
forms in other parts of the world, the Greeks created something different. For the first 
time the law was made available to and was intended to be used by the entire 
citizenry.” MICHAEL GARAGIN, EARLY GREEK LAW 146 (1986). 
 67 See RUSS VERSTEEG, LAW IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 189, 190 (2002); 
Madden, supra note 65, at 868-85.  
 68 Madden, supra note 65, at 871 (quoting HESIOD, Works and Days, in 
THEOGONY, WORKS AND DAYS, SHIELD, II 370-72, at 74 (Apostolos N. Athanassakis 
trans., 2d ed. 2004)). 
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Hesiod’s writing suggests that the Greek notion of slander and 
libel was not restricted to speech that diminished reputation 
but also covered speech that inflicted emotional injury, such as 
gossip: “[I]t is easy to get a bad reputation but hard to live with 
it and harder to shed it. What is said of you does not vanish, if 
many say it; such talk is a kind of god.”69 
Writing at about 350 BC, Aristotle specified certain 
wrongs that required an act of court to restore the status quo ante 
of equality between the injurer and the injured, and among these 
“violent” wrongs requiring correction were “abuse, [and] insult.”70  
The Code of Draco was the first written law 
promulgated in Athens, but there is little evidence today of its 
specific provisions.71 What is known is that Draco’s sometimes 
harsh penalties for prohibited conduct were designed “as a 
substitute for unrestrained self-help . . . to curb violent 
conduct, particularly revenge.”72 
The later and better-respected Code of Solon, which 
ameliorated much of the harshness associated with the 
Draconian code, reflected the value Greek law placed on 
dignitary interests. First, Solon’s code set a specific penalty for 
libel, a portion of which went to the victim of the speech and a 
portion of which was paid to the state.73 It barred “speaking ill 
of anyone while in a temple, in court at trial, in public offices, 
or while at festival contests.”74 Moreover, that code did not stop 
at protecting the reputations of citizens in the community. It 
also barred libeling the dead, “not on account of injury to the 
dead, but in respect to the quiet of families” and “the peace and 
honor of Athens.”75 This text suggests that Greek law did not 
set up artificial distinctions between the interrelated dignitary 
interests of reputation, privacy, and emotional tranquility. 
Instead, it recognized that speech could intrude on more than 
one of these interests simultaneously because the interests are 
virtually unitary.76 
  
 69 Id. at 871 n.19 (quoting HESIOD, supra note 68, II 760-64, at 83). 
 70 Id. at 883 (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, in INTRODUCTION TO 
ARISTOTLE, bk. V, ch. 2, at 402).  
 71 VERSTEEG, supra note 67, at 194. 
 72 Id. at 195. 
 73 GARAGIN, supra note 66, at 65; VERSTEEG, supra note 67, at 254.  
 74 VERSTEEG, supra note 67, at 254.  
 75 Gregory C. Lisby, No Place in the Law: The Ignominy of Criminal Libel in 
American Jurisprudence, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 433, 442-43 (2004) (quoting MARTIN L. 
NEWELL, THE LAW OF SLANDER AND LIBEL IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 5-6 (1914)).  
 76 Notably, Greek and Roman law were unique at the time in that they set a 
monetary value for incursions on dignitary interests in order to allow intra-community 
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Ultimately, Greek law is recognized for developing 
rigorous systems of thought about the relative rights of 
individuals and the state, and for establishing the 
philosophical underpinnings of tort law. But, despite the 
Solonian codification and the “Reinscription” of the laws of 
Solon and the homicide law of Draco at the close of the fifth 
century BC, ancient Greece is not celebrated for an elaboration 
of these analyses into a practical code applicable to a wide 
variety of disputes. This milestone was supplied by Rome. 
2. Rome 
Some say that Rome’s greatest legal legacy was the 
development of private law, a substantial portion of which 
dealt with delicts.77 One of the three major delicts was iniuria, 
variously translated as insult or outrage.78 The scope of iniurial 
liability is sometimes said to capture “injuries less than death 
to humans.”79 Generally agreed to be found within Table VII of 
  
resolution without recourse to violence, rather than characterizing the behavior 
exclusively as a crime leading to state punishment. Greece did recognize the speech 
crime “hubris,” which included “abusive and humiliating public assaults.” This was 
considered difficult to prove because it required proving an “arrogant, self-righteous, 
irresponsible” state of mind. Lisby, supra note 75, at 441. In essence, Greek law served 
as a “bridge” between societies that treated similar offenses as crimes subject to state-
sponsored punishment and the later law of Rome and its Western descendants, which 
largely treated dignitary affronts as private law matters. Id. For instance, the Babylonian 
Code of Hammurabi of 1770 BC barred insults to women and false accusations of capital 
crimes, but punished them by branding and death, respectively. Id. Unlike that system, 
Greece moved towards the private-law treatment of such offenses, and Rome conclusively 
treated intra-community injuries inflicted via speech as private law matters, while 
retaining a criminal response to public speech against civic leaders. Cristina Carmody 
Tilley, Reviving Slander, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1025, 1032-40.  
 77 KATHERINE FISCHER DREW, THE LAWS OF THE SALIAN FRANKS 12 (1991). It 
is no surprise that tectonic shifts in Roman society led to the creation of the first formal 
system of private law in Rome. Although kings held power at one time in ancient 
Rome, the aristocracy was dissatisfied with their rule and deposed them. In their 
stead, two offices of Consul were established to oversee administrative matters of the 
state. Plebians, who had been protected from the caprice of the patricians by the 
monarchy, now found themselves subject to application of the law as devised by those 
patricians without notice to the lower classes. In response to plebian demands, a 
committee was appointed to set out all the laws in writing. The result was the Twelve 
Tables. The tables were “a comprehensive collection or code of rules . . . consist[ing] for 
the most part of ancient Latin custom, but . . . [incorporating some] rules of Greek 
Law.” W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 2 
(1921). But see ANDREW BORKOWSKI, TEXTBOOK ON ROMAN LAW 26 (1994) (questioning 
Greek connection). 
 78 BORKOWSKI, supra note 77, at 303; W.W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD MCNAIR, 
ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 295 (1936); BRUCE W. FRIER, A CASEBOOK ON THE 
ROMAN LAW OF DELICT 177 (1989). 
 79 ALAN WATSON, STUDIES IN ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 253 (1991).  
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the Twelve Tables, the provision for iniuria may be translated 
as follows:  
If a person has maimed another’s limb, let there be retaliation in 
kind unless he makes agreement for composition with him. If he has 
broken or bruised freeman’s bone with hand or club, he shall 
undergo penalty of 300 pieces; if slave’s, 250. If he has done simple 
harm [to another], penalties shall be 25 pieces.80  
Most scholars agree that when the Twelve Tables were 
adopted in the fifth century BC, the “simple harm” provision 
was aimed primarily at minor physical injuries. Rapidly, 
however, this “catch-all” provision of the iniuria delict was 
interpreted to include a raft of non-physical injuries to 
interests described in the literature as “dignity and personal 
well-being”81 or freedom from “contempt of the personality.”82 As 
one scholar has summarized, “Iniuria . . . serves to protect the 
individual by creating a legally defensible perimeter for his or 
her personal life.”83  
Thus, one thousand years later, by the time the Emperor 
Justinian codified Roman law in the Corpus Juris Civilis, the 
delict of iniuria as expanded by juristic interpretations and 
various amendatory edicts was described as:  
[I]nflicted not only by striking with the fist, a stick, or a whip, but 
also by vituperation for the purpose of collecting a crowd, or by 
taking possession of a man’s effects on the ground that he was in 
one’s debt; or by writing, composing, or publishing defamatory prose 
or verse, or contriving the doing of any of these things by some one 
else; or by constantly following a matron, or a young boy or girl 
below the age of puberty, or attempting anybody’s chastity; and, in a 
word, by innumerable other acts.84  
Examining the fact patterns that led to non-physical 
iniurial liability, one sees that the category dealt neatly with 
the behavior underlying the IIED tort of the American system. 
Iniuria protected corpus, dignitas, and fama, roughly translated 
as body, dignity, and reputation. The following behavior was all 
considered iniuria because it violated the dignity interest: (1) 
behavior defiling dead bodies or estates, such as defacing 
  
 80 Id. 
 81 FRIER, supra note 78, at 177. 
 82 BUCKLAND, supra note 77, at 585; H.F. JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICHOLAS, 
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 171 (3d ed. 1972). 
 83 FRIER, supra note 78, at 177.  
 84 Francis L. Coolidge, Jr., Note, Iniuria in the Corpus Juris Civilis, 50 B.U. 
L. REV. 271, 272 (1970). 
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graves;85 (2) harassment relating to one’s financial affairs, such 
as restricting a person’s access to his property or publicly calling 
him a debtor;86 (3) overtures upon the chastity of a modest 
person, such as a public proposition;87 (4) insulting or hurtful 
speech, including the use of epithets or the incitement of a mob; 
(5) invasion of privacy, such as interference with a person’s 
domus, which, roughly translated, means the place where a 
person’s daily affairs take place;88 and, (6) defamation, which 
included publishing defamatory prose or verse.89  
A short comparison with American tort law shows a 
remarkably similar cluster of behaviors leading to liability. 
Early surveys of cases coming under the heading of the “new 
tort” of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the United 
States identify the following as classic fact patterns: (1) “the 
mishandling of dead bodies, whether by mutilation, 
disinterment, interference with burial, or other forms of 
intentional disturbance;”90 (2) the tactics of “collecting 
creditors,”91 which include “violent cursing, abuse and 
accusations of dishonesty,”92 threatening a lawsuit or arrest, and 
advertising the debt to family, neighbors, and employers; (3) 
  
 85 “[H]itting with stones the statue on the tomb of another’s father, digging 
up and removing bones or a body buried by someone else not a relative, on one’s land, 
burying a wealthy dead man without the appropriate expense, . . . [and] injury done to 
a corpse” were all considered iniuria. CHITTHARANJAN FELIX AMERASINGHE, 
DEFAMATION AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE ACTIO INIURIARUM IN ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 
330 (1968) (footnotes omitted). 
 86 For instance, behavior casting doubt on a person’s right to possess property, 
such as “prevent[ing] the removal of . . . property” or “sealing up the house of an absent 
debtor” as recourse for implied default, was considered an affront to dignity—an insult 
that amounted to iniuria. Id. at 327. So were “objecting to a judgment debtor’s retaining 
any provisions or his bed,” or “addressing a person as one’s debtor when he was not.” 
Finally, abuse of legal process was considered iniuria. Id. at 327-30.  
 87 “[D]ebauching [or abducting] a boy under seventeen, . . . soliciting a woman 
or a girl . . . [for the purpose of sex], indecently accosting or following [a woman or a 
girl],” attempting to induce adultery, adultery itself and exposing of the genitals to a 
woman or a girl were all considered iniuria. Id. at 329 (footnotes omitted). 
 88 Thus, a person need not possess his domus to have a cause of action for 
iniuria, and even if he did possess a large estate, interference with zones that include 
outbuildings or stables was not iniuria. Moreover, interference with business premises, 
if access to those premises was meant to be limited, could be iniuria. Domus-related 
iniuria seems to have as its “common factor . . . not . . . possession but some form of 
right to privacy understood in a rather elementary sense.” Id. at 326-27.  
 89 For instance, shouts, whether alone or in a group, directed at an 
individual, were considered iniuria. So was the deployment of “foul or obscene” 
language against an individual. Id. at 330. 
 90 William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 
37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 885-86 (1939) (hereinafter Prosser, Intentional Infliction). 
 91 Id. at 884. 
 92 Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra note 16, at 48. 
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public accusations of unchastity against teenage girls;93 (4) the 
convening of crowds to raise a disturbance against an 
individual;94 (5) actions of “[e]victing landlords” who “tear[] up the 
premises, smok[e] out the tenants, or throw[] the furniture 
about;” and (6) “oppressive and outrageous conduct, such as 
verbal or written abuse, vituperation, and threats.”95 Notably, the 
five classic American IIED patterns align exactly with the 
Roman iniurial patterns: disrespect for the dead, harassment by 
creditors, allegations of unchastity, invasions of privacy, and 
abusive speech.96 
The Roman law’s solicitude for these interests of 
“personality” reflected the momentum away from a tribal 
society and toward a more complex and civilized social order. 
The ever more vigilant protection of personality interests was a 
device to exchange money or public rehabilitation for violent 
vengeance in order to honor an “unremitting concern with 
public order.”97 One torts expert has opined that the more 
sophisticated a society, the more developed will be “legal 
protection to nonmaterial interests of personality like self-
respect, reputation, and privacy.”98  
  
 93 Prosser, Intentional Infliction, supra note 90, at 885. 
 94 Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra note 16, at 47, 49.  
 95 Prosser, Intentional Infliction, supra note 90, at 881. 
 96 Notably, some behavior that was considered a violation of fama, or 
reputational, interests, such as the raising of a clamor against a plaintiff or the use of 
insulting or offensive language, falls within the modern tort of defamation and is similar 
if not identical to the dignitas violations. Among these behaviors were: calling a person a 
slave, casting doubts on someone’s modesty, imputing of debt default, and holding a 
frugal funeral for a wealthy man. AMERASINGHE, supra note 85, at 332. And some speech 
was considered iniuria as a reputational violation even if it was not thought to assault a 
person’s dignity, placing it on all fours with the defamation tort. For instance, 
“composing, publishing or procuring the publication . . . of a defamatory writing,” or any 
conduct that “excit[ed] odium . . . against anyone,” was considered an incursion upon one’s 
reputation and therefore iniuria. Id. at 331-32. Similarly, many of the behaviors captured 
by iniuria, such as violating the domus, or physically shadowing a vulnerable person, 
would be captured by one of the privacy torts today. In short, Roman iniuria was a 
flexible cause of action, covering numerous overlapping “personality” interests without 
attempting to extricate them for distinct legal treatment.  
 97 FRIER, supra note 78, at 177 (quoting J.G. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE LAW OF TORTS 192 (1985)). See id. at 1 (“Delictual liability is thought to have 
originated, in archaic Roman law, as a substitute for immediate personal vengeance.”); 
BUCKLAND, supra note 77, at 571 (“It was in origin a legal substitute for self-help, 
which in this case meant revenge.”).  
 98 FRIER, supra note 78, at 177; Cf. Solomon, supra note 2, at 1783-84 
(observing that such a forum to avenge interpersonal wrongs may be seen as condoning 
uncivilized impulses). 
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B. Modern Law 
After the fall of Rome, many of the European countries 
that grew up in its stead took Roman civil law as their 
foundation. “[I]t is a commonplace with legal historians that 
Roman law was in course of time made, often in modified form, 
the basis of large parts of what we have come to call the Civil 
Law Systems,” observed one legal historian in 1969.99 England, 
however, which developed a common-law system, did not 
explicitly incorporate principles of Roman law. Thus, while 
many civil-law systems in Europe retained the flexible 
approach to incursions upon dignity, honor, feelings, and 
reputation,100 England initially peeled off all of the non-
  
 99 THE ROMAN LAW READER 170 (F.H. Lawson ed., 1969).  
 100 The fact that numerous European and civil-law countries matter-of-factly 
recognized the dignitary rights in their legal systems reinforces their place as 
“universal,” “civilized” rights for natural-law purposes, further supporting their Ninth 
Amendment status as “rights retained.” See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 62, at 204. 
  The iniurial action against outrage and insult largely survived in the civil-
law countries that carried forward the Roman system. “[M]any civil code jurisdictions 
[including Argentina, Austria, Chile, France, Italy, Liberia, Spain, and West 
Germany], drawing from the Corpus Juris Civilis, have incorporated similar provisions 
concerning injury into their legal systems.” See Coolidge, supra note 84, at 284. For 
instance, Roman-Dutch law applied in South Africa and Ceylon “was also concerned 
with dignitas in general as an interest to be protected” even where reputation was not 
assailed. AMERASINGHE, supra note 85, at 276. Specifically, the Roman-Dutch cause of 
action actio iniuriarum considers breaches of contract, where humiliating, to be 
actionable, as are breaches of promise to marry; public use of abusive language or 
epithets, see id. at 290; interference with rights such as school access or public honors; 
wrongs against chastity; unjustified denials of credit; unjustified threats of lawsuit; 
and interference with tombs or burials. These causes of action correspond directly to 
Roman iniuria patterns, which also targeted abusive speech, creditor conduct, 
accusations of unchastity, and disrespect for the dead.  
  In fact, the accepted gulf between private law regulating individual 
relationships and public law regulating the interaction between the state and the 
individual emerged in European systems as a direct result of the Roman law example. 
See Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory, 48 
MD. L. REV. 247, 255 (1989). Much of the vacuum left by the fall of the Roman Empire 
was filled by Germanic tribes. By 534, the Franks controlled most of what had been 
Roman Gaul. The ruler at that time, Clovis, took a distinctly Roman approach to 
governance. Predictably, within the Frankish codes, great emphasis is placed on 
dignity, both in terms of reputation and emotional well-being. The Lex Salica of the 
Franks contains, within the chapter “Concerning Abusive Terms,” seven distinct 
sections. DREW, supra note 77, at 94. These sections assign penalties for statements 
that diminish reputation, such as accusations of illicit behavior including pederasty, 
prostitution, “throwing down [the] shield,” and informing. Id. But they also assign 
sanctions to statements that reflect ill opinion of a would-be plaintiff and arguably 
invade the emotional sphere more than the reputational interest, such as claiming that 
someone “is covered in dung,” or is “a fox” or “a rabbit.” Id. Another chapter sanctions 
false imputations of indebtedness and baseless repossession. Id. at 115. Finally, as in 
Roman law, an entire chapter of Frankish law, with seven distinct sections, outlines 
causes of action for “Despoiling Dead Bodies.” Id. at 118-19.  
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pecuniary dignitary interests as incompensable. It interpreted 
reputation as a form of property and developed a complex 
system of defamation law. It ostensibly declined to recognize 
suits for outrage or insult. In practice, however, it often allowed 
compensation for these injuries when pleaded as defamation, 
and Anglo-American courts have recently reintegrated these 
interests into the common law as freestanding torts. This 
development is traced below. 
1. Common Law and the English Experience 
The history of the dignitary torts in English common 
law is far more circuitous than in neighboring civil-law 
countries.101 England consciously declined to take Roman law as 
the basis for its system. “We have received Roman law,” 
explained one historian, “but we have received it in small 
homeopathic doses, at different periods, and as and when 
required. It has acted as a tonic to our native legal system, and 
not as a drug or a poison. When received it has never been 
continuously developed on Roman lines.”102 Roman law is 
generally not a source of precedent in English courts.103  
Despite this latter-day disavowal, early Anglo-Saxon 
law appears to have adopted the same broad, flexible approach 
found in Roman law. Arising from “customary or traditional 
material” in these cultures, codes promulgated by Anglo-Saxon 
  
  Given these strong legal protections for dignitary interests encompassing 
reputation, honor, and emotional well-being, it is no surprise that modern German law 
is extremely protective of personality interests. Not only does the German Civil Code 
allow individuals to seek a remedy from “a person who ‘intentionally causes injury to 
another person in a manner contrary to good morals,’” Quint, supra, at 253, but the 
country’s 1949 Constitution, known as the Basic Law, recognizes the rights of 
individuals to “[h]uman dignity,” and “the free development of [their] personality,” 
often thought to include a right to privacy. Id. at 257, 299. In fact, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, designed primarily to address constitutional questions, has 
wrestled with “the permanent state of tension” arising from the conflict between the 
cultural acceptance of the Civil Code and the occasionally conflicting dictates of the 
Basic Law. Id. at 290; see also Melius de Villiers, The Roman Law of Defamation, 34 
L.Q. REV. 412, 418 (1918). A similar tension has been replicated in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 10, which protects freedom of expression, and 
Article 8, which protects individual privacy. See, e.g., Jessica Hodgson, What Articles 8 
and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights Mean, GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2002, 
8:54 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2002/mar/27/pressandpublishing.privacy4.  
 101 See supra note 100. 
 102 THE ROMAN LAW READER, supra note 99, at 206 (quoting W.S. 
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW IV 293 (1924)).  
 103 Id. at 215. But see BILL GRIFFITHS, AN INTRODUCTION TO EARLY ENGLISH 
LAW 31 (1995) (explaining that Anglo-Saxon law did incorporate Frankish law, which 
drew on Roman law). 
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kings set forth specific penalties for specific injuries just as in 
the Roman Twelve Tables.104 One scholar has said that, in the 
Anglo-Saxon system, as in Rome, the predetermined penalties 
for specific wrongs were designed to minimize interpersonal 
violence. “[I]t illustrates how sensitive this society was to 
considerations of mere dignity, and how easily a trivial brawl 
could flare up into a feud unless damped down at once by some 
satisfaction . . . .”105 One of the earliest Anglo-Saxon law codes, 
given by Aethelbert of Kent at the beginning of the seventh 
century, recognizes dignity as a touchstone and sets forth 
“seizing or pulling by the hair” as among the physical injuries 
requiring compensation.106 This prohibition was not viewed as a 
species of assault but rather as a blot on the victim’s feelings or 
reputation. “The act is, of course, one of humiliation within a 
cultural tradition . . . [that] laid special emphasis on the status 
of hair length . . . .”107 The code given by the subsequent kings, 
Hlothere and Eadric, broadened the prohibition and suggested 
that penalties must be made for words that damage reputation 
or dignity. According to the decrees, “If one man calls another a 
perjurer in a third man’s house, or accosts him abusively with 
insulting words, he shall pay one shilling to him who owns the 
house, 6 shillings to him he has accosted, and 12 shillings to 
the king.”108 That the payment is made not just to the victim but 
to the property owner and to the king suggests that the violent 
effects likely to be produced by the words are a substantial 
portion of the rationale for the prohibition. The state has an 
interest in preempting the violence and thus fixes a price for 
the words, along with directing individual compensation.  
The laws of King Alfred, dating from the 870s, 
developed the concept of slander with more specificity. 
Integrating Biblical commands, Alfred’s code advised in a 
preface against “giv[ing] credence to the word of a false 
  
 104 By the time the Anglo-Saxons settled there, England  
had been to a degree cut off from its Roman contacts for some time . . . and 
had always been out on the fringes of Roman territory . . . . [so] there was no 
need to retain Roman-law courts or Roman law in Germanic Britain and 
therefore Roman legal ideas . . . seem to have had little if any influence on 
Anglo-Saxon law.  
DREW, supra note 77, at 25. 
 105 GRIFFITHS, supra note 103, at 10 (quoting K.P. WITNEY, THE KINGDOM OF 
KENT 96 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 106 Id. at 36 (emphasis omitted).  
 107 Id. at 36 n.22 (citations omitted). 
 108 F.L. ATTENBOROUGH, THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS 21 (1922) 
(footnote omitted).  
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man . . . [or] repeat[ing] any of his assertions.”109 It also advised 
against spreading rumors or gossip, and set a talion for 
slander—the defendant could have his tongue cut out or pay 
the plaintiff and keep his tongue.110 
All of these early Anglo-Saxon laws were promulgated 
for use in a society comprising mainly insular local agrarian 
communities, and the laws emphasized popular participation.111 
This use of community assemblies to mediate community 
disputes about compromised honor became less practical after 
Alfred’s death, when closed agrarian communities gave way to 
a more integrated society and a more centralized government.112 
In addition, the movement of more individuals into the servile 
class meant that fewer in the country could carry weapons, so 
that insults between lower class individuals were resolved 
more often by an exchange of money than by duels.113 Men of 
status, in contrast, continued to defend their honor by duels.114 
The early Anglo-Saxon law continued to treat all 
dignitary interests as compensable in private actions until the 
Norman conquest of England in 1066. Even then, however, 
defamation appears to have been peeled off from the actions for 
invasion of privacy and emotional injury more as a product of 
jurisdictional development than as the result of a considered 
analysis. Defamation came to be defined as charging another 
with a violation of canon law, and it was delegated to the 
ecclesiastical courts.115 In contrast, local English or Norman 
assemblies retained jurisdiction over disputes involving insults 
that did not explicitly sully the victim as a canon law violator.116 
As the disintegration of the decentralized feudal structure 
diminished the manorial courts, however, “denial of a 
[common-law court] remedy at Westminster c[a]me to be denial 
of a right,”117 and during the Elizabethan period, the common-
law courts began hearing actions for defamation. Unlike their 
predecessors in the manorial courts, these actions were strictly 
  
 109 GRIFFITHS, supra note 103, at 52. 
 110 Id. at 68. 
 111 Anthony D’Amato & Stephen B. Presser, Anglo-Saxon Law, in GUIDE TO 
AMERICAN LAW: EVERYONE’S LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 251, 252 (1985). 
 112 GRIFFITHS, supra note 103, at 15.  
 113 Colin Rhys Lovell, The “Reception” of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 
VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1053-54 (1962).  
 114 Id. at 1053. 
 115 Id. at 1054. 
 116 See id. at 1054-55. 
 117 Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 
COLUM. L. REV. 546, 556 (1903). 
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limited to charges affecting reputation. Just as the 
ecclesiastical courts had offered a remedy only for charges of 
violating canon law, the common-law courts offered a remedy 
only for charges of committing a crime.118 Thus, like the canon 
law, the common law “thereby exclud[ed] . . . merely violent or 
offensive language from its definition of defamation.”119 
Moreover, by 1593, the ecclesiastical courts ceded litigation 
over words that caused special damage or temporal loss to the 
common-law courts.120 As a result of these developments, 
English law had serendipitously evolved so that “[t]he gist of 
the action on the case for words was the [monetary] damage 
caused to the plaintiff and not the insult itself.”121  
In time, however, the English common law bent to 
accommodate claims for words that violated mental tranquility 
without diminishing reputation. This development brought 
English law back into line with longstanding Western 
traditions despite a departure of several hundred years. By 
1897, the English common law specifically developed the tort of 
intentional infliction of nervous shock in Wilkinson v. 
Downton.122 The court concluded that where a practical joker 
told a woman her husband had been “smashed up” just to see 
her reaction, the act was calculated “to infringe her legal right 
to personal safety” and thus was a good cause of action.123 
Intentional infliction of nervous shock, which turns on the 
foreseeability of some physical manifestation of shock, has been 
applied by English courts for more than a century to the same 
fact patterns seen in Roman and Anglo-Saxon law, such as 
spitting on a plaintiff, cutting her hair against her will, or 
“throwing a coin contemptuously on the plaintiff’s hospital 
bed.”124 In all of these circumstances, the physical contact 
causes negligible pain, but the non-physical dignitary 
implications weigh heavily on the plaintiff’s emotional 
wellness. In fact, for the past several decades, English, 
Canadian, and Australian commentators have been urging the 
adoption of a tort for the intentional infliction of pure 
  
 118 Lovell, supra note 113, at 1063.  
 119 Id.  
 120 See R.C. Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 WIS. L. REV. 99, 112 (1949).  
 121 Id. at 115.  
 122 2 Q.B. 57, 58 (1897). 
 123 Id. at 59; see also Denise G. Réaume, Indignities: Making a Place for Dignity 
in Modern Legal Thought, 28 QUEEN’S L.J. 61, 66-67 (2002). The evolution of English law 
to provide some protection for non-economic injuries to emotional well-being coincided 
with the abolition of formalistic writs to more flexible models of pleading. 
 124 Réaume, supra note 123, at 74.  
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emotional harm; some have even suggested extending the tort 
to a unitary claim for assault on dignity.125  
In contrast, English courts have not aligned with the 
majority of Western countries in recognizing a freestanding 
right to sue in tort for invasions of personal privacy. Writing in 
1962, one scholar stated “with some confidence that English 
law does not recognise what [American] Judge [Thomas] Cooley 
called ‘the right to be left alone.’”126 But as with intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, there is some evidence that 
English courts occasionally tried to protect privacy interests by 
stretching other causes of action to cover them. Most famously, 
in Prince Albert v. Strange,127 a man was prevented from 
exhibiting and selling copies of impressions he had procured of 
etchings made by Queen Victoria and Prince Albert. The case 
was not explicitly decided in terms of privacy, rather as a 
violation of the royals’ proprietary rights in the commercial 
uses of the etchings.128 The court hazarded, however, that in the 
alternative, the proposed exhibition could have been enjoined 
on the basis of “breach of trust, confidence[,] or contract.”129 
That suggestion was the springboard for Warren and 
Brandeis’s seminal article, The Right to Privacy, proposing the 
development of an independent tort for privacy violations.130 
English scholars and legislatures supported the development of 
similar actions in English common law throughout the 
twentieth century, but to no avail.131 Notably, at least one 
suggested that in the absence of a discrete privacy tort, courts 
could vindicate plaintiffs by invoking the intentional infliction 
of nervous shock tort announced in Wilkinson.132 In sum, 
English courts have long recognized a tort of defamation and 
have reintegrated into their common law the idea of 
  
 125 Id. at 73 (citations omitted).  
 126 Brian Neill, The Protection of Privacy, 25 MOD. L. REV. 393, 394 (1962) 
(quoting THOMAS COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)). 
 127 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (1849). 
 128 Neill, supra note 126, at 395. (In fact, this reasoning is similar to the “right 
of publicity” branch of American privacy torts.). 
 129 Id. at 396. 
 130 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 203-05 (1890). 
 131 See, e.g., Neill, supra note 126, at 400-02; Percy H. Winfield, Privacy, 47 L. 
Q. REV. 23 (1931). 
 132 Neill, supra note 126, at 402. Today, English experts have suggested that 
the incorporation in the U.K. Human Rights Act of 1998 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, Article 8, which guarantees a right of privacy, is leading to English 
acceptance of a common-law privacy right. Basil Markesinis et al., Concerns and Ideas 
About the Developing English Law of Privacy (And How Knowledge of Foreign Law 
Might Be of Help), 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 133, 133-34 (2004). 
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vindicating emotional injuries, while they continue to award 
damages only covertly to plaintiffs whose privacy was invaded.  
2. English Theory—Natural Law 
As English courts were developing common-law doctrine 
on recourse for dignitary rights, English scholars were 
considering the same ideas from a more abstract perspective—
one that informed the Framers’ thinking about the relationship 
between individuals and the state. Although many English 
philosophers and legal scholars developed theories of natural 
law, the two primary guides for the Framers were John Locke 
and William Blackstone.133 
a. Locke 
Locke and other natural-law rights theorists of the 
Enlightenment developed the idea that the capacity for reason 
meant that all human beings were entitled to dignity, 
regardless of rank or social status.134 Locke, in particular, 
contended that natural rights should be recognized with “a 
place . . . in governance.”135 Among the natural rights Locke 
discussed was an “ownership interest in one’s own personhood,” 
a right which had “considerable reach” and was “inextricably 
tied up with the inherent dignity and liberty of the 
individual.”136 Specifically, Locke observed that natural law 
prohibited speech that can injure a third party’s well-being:  
[I]n customary intercourse among men and in communal life who is 
bound to hold a conversation about his neighbour and to meddle with 
other people’s affairs? No one, surely. Anyone can without harm 
either talk or be silent. But if perchance one wants to talk about 
another person, the law of nature undoubtedly enjoins that one’s 
talk be candid and friendly and that one should say things that do 
not harm that other person’s reputation and character.137  
  
 133 See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 56, at 260; Jackson, Blackstone, supra note 46, 
at 171. 
 134 Libby Adler, The Dignity of Sex, 17 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 9 (2008).  
 135 Id.  
 136 J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of Rights: The Rhetoric and 
Practice of Rights in America, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 284 (2010). 
 137 JOHN LOCKE, Essay 7, Is the Binding Force of the Law of Nature Perpetual 
and Universal? Yes, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE 195-96 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1989) (1954). 
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b. Blackstone 
Blackstone’s Commentaries are also considered a 
touchstone for interpreting constitutional language because 
they were a virtual hornbook for colonial lawyers and 
constitutional draftsman.138 Notably, the “natural law” 
explicated by Blackstone had “roots running deep into the soil 
of ancient Greece and Rome.”139 Blackstone identified three 
“absolute rights, . . . vested in [men] by the immutable laws of 
nature.”140 These three were the right of “personal security,” 
which consisted of a person’s “uninterrupted enjoyment of his 
life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation”; 
“personal liberty,” which consisted of “the power of locomotion, 
of changing situation, or moving one’s person to whatsoever 
place one’s own inclination may direct”; and “the right 
of . . . property, [which consisted] of the free use, enjoyment, 
and disposal of all [an individual’s] acquisitions, without any 
control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.”141 
Blackstone also recognized among the “relative” rights 
necessary to effectuating these absolute rights an entitlement 
to “apply to the courts for speedy redress of injuries.”142 
Reputation is recognized textually among Blackstone’s 
natural-law rights, and it is beyond dispute that it was 
considered one of the “Rights of Englishmen” incorporated into 
colonial law.143 In addition, some adherents of Blackstone have 
suggested that privacy is among his fundamental rights, 
although it is not within the explicit text.144 For instance, a 
  
 138 Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4-7 
(1996). Not all who participated in drafting the Constitution were uncritical of 
Blackstone, who was not a supporter of the colonies. Id.  
 139 Id. at 17 (quoting LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE 
AND TIMES OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 249 (1991)). Blackstone’s underlying Roman 
law orientation is not surprising, given that he sought and was denied an appointment 
to teach Roman law at Oxford. Rebuffed, he developed a specialty in English law. One 
wonders whether the received wisdom that English law took no notice of Roman law 
results from the fact that the leading mouthpiece for English law was denied 
recognition as a Roman law scholar. See id. at 4-5. 
 140 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *124. 
 141 Michael B. Kent, Jr., Pavesich, Property and Privacy: The Common Origins 
of Property Rights and Privacy Rights in Georgia, 2 J. MARSHALL L.J. 1, 11-12 (2009) 
(quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 140, at *138) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 142 Jackson, Blackstone, supra note 46, at 208. 
 143 Id. at 207 (citing 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 140, at *129). 
 144 To be clear, the concept of privacy relevant to this article is a tort concept, 
enforceable by one private individual by post-invasion suit against another private 
individual. The concept of a constitutional right to privacy from government intrusion, 
originally recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), is not the subject 
of this article. The distinction between privacy as tort and privacy as individual right 
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Georgia court that was among the first to embrace a tort right 
to privacy “cited Blackstone as additional support for [the 
recognition of a privacy tort], explicitly rooting the right of 
privacy in Blackstone’s conceptions of personal security and 
personal liberty.”145 Privacy can also be found as a component of 
Blackstonian property rights, the court reasoned, because the 
property right of “quiet enjoyment” is violated when “the 
common scold” tramples on the individual’s right “to use, 
occupy, and enjoy the general functioning of . . . society in a 
quiet and peaceable manner.”146 This right is protected by 
punishing “the scold” in tort.147 Similarly, Blackstone’s reference 
to “health” as a component of personal security suggests that 
mental health (today recognized as a medical dimension of the 
emotional tranquility protected by IIED) is arguably among 
Blackstone’s natural rights. English scholars, this survey 
suggests, recognized all three interests—privacy, reputation, 
and emotional security—as natural-law rights, which in turn, 
influenced the American experience. 
3. The American Experience 
American law, in the form of state constitutions and state 
common law, strongly endorsed the right of individuals to protect 
their reputations via common-law tort suits at the time of 
ratification. Further, the evolution of the common law over the 
next 150 years shows that American courts gradually moved from 
informally recognizing privacy and emotional security rights to 
explicit adoption of tort causes of action for their invasion. 
a. State Constitutions 
A survey of state constitutions in effect at the time of 
ratification illustrates that the freedoms of speech and of the 
press were not contemporaneously considered to foreclose the 
private right to sue for defamation. Americans of the period 
tended to “assume[] that certain types of speech or press—
including blasphemous, obscene, fraudulent, or defamatory 
  
against the government was noted by Justice Black in Griswold. See id. at 510 n.1 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
 145 Kent, supra note 141, at 12 (citing Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 
S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905)).  
 146 Id. at 18-19. 
 147 Id. at 18, 19 n.88.  
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words—lacked or should lack constitutional protection.”148 In 
fact, a number of state constitutions specifically wrote in 
protection for the right to sue for defamatory statements. 
Pennsylvania’s 1790 constitution, for instance, “said that every 
citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being 
responsible for the abuse of that liberty.”149 The Delaware, 
Massachusetts, and Kentucky Constitutions, which were also 
in effect during the ratification periods, followed suit.150 The 
original public understanding of the internal limits on freedom 
of speech and press was not limited to defamatory statements 
alone. During the debate over the 1780 Massachusetts 
Constitution, one proposed speech and press clause barred 
restrictions on speech freedoms “unless in Cases where it is 
extended to the abuse, or injury of Private Characters.”151 This 
trend towards state constitutional protection of the right to sue 
for libel152 had expanded, not contracted, by the time the 
  
 148 Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American 
Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 935 (1993). As recently as 2012, the Supreme Court 
reiterated that several categories of speech, including “advocacy intended, and likely, to 
incite imminent lawless action, . . . obscenity, . . . defamation, . . . speech integral to 
criminal conduct, . . . ‘fighting words,’ . . . child pornography, . . . fraud, . . . true 
threats, . . . and speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government 
has the power to prevent” are not presumptively protected speech. United States v. 
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). The 
consistency of these categories, many of which involve personality interests long-
protected in Western law, corroborates this initial view that the First Amendment can 
be applied with reference to other considerations. 
 149 Hamburger, supra note 148, at 936 n.83 (citing PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, 
§ 7) (emphasis added). Notably, this understanding has also informed First 
Amendment scrutiny of speech-restrictive statutes and regulations addressing 
obscenity, volume, and likelihood of inciting violence. See, e.g., Heyman, supra note 37, 
at 1279 (noting that government restrictions on obscenity, perjury and the like are 
widely considered uncontroversial). 
 150 Hamburger, supra note 148, at 936 n.83. 
 151 Id. (emphasis added). 
 152 To be clear, this article is concerned solely with the ability of private 
individuals to sue in tort for speech-inflicted injuries. The latitude of the states to 
provide for criminal prosecution of libel is an entirely different issue, although 
historically many states provided for both civil and criminal remedies for speech 
injuries. See, e.g., Lisby, supra note 75, at 456-57. The criminal and the civil causes of 
action share one justification; both were initially designed to prevent violence. 
However, today, criminal libel actions are viewed more as a species of seditious libel, 
generally brought not because the words at issue are likely to cause violence requiring 
state oversight, but because the words criticize government or government officers. See 
id. at 473-74 (discussing the relationship between purely civil libel, criminal libel based 
on apolitical but incendiary speech, and criminal libel arising from criticism of 
government). Although the Court has long held that the provision of a state forum for 
resolution of private conflicts is a form of state action triggering the Fourteenth, and 
consequently the First, Amendments, the action of the state in passing a law ex ante 
prohibiting entire categories of anti-government speech is qualitatively different than 
the action of the state in establishing a mechanism whereby private individuals can 
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Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, which ultimately resulted 
in application of the First Amendment against not just the 
federal government, but state governments as well. In 1868, 
twenty-seven of the thirty-seven states’ constitutions featured 
language “explicitly contemplat[ing] the bringing of at least 
some libel suits.”153  
b. State Common Law 
At the founding, and for almost two centuries after, 
states offered their courts as a forum for the resolution of 
private disputes between individuals arising from incursions 
on dignity. Until the early 1900s, the only common-law cause of 
action permitting redress for dignitary harms was defamation 
(strictly cabined between slander and libel, at the time), so 
most dignitary harms were pleaded as defamation. However, 
some of the “defamation” cases appear to involve slights to 
interests other than reputation. The “defamation” category was 
used to smuggle in litigation over the broader basket of 
dignitary interests.154 Eventually, in part because of the 
changing nature of newspapers and in part because of 
expansion of the common law to include actions for invasion of 
privacy and intentional infliction, some dignitary lawsuits that 
might have been awkwardly slotted as “defamation” entered 
into the privacy and intentional infliction channels of tort. 
i. Slander and Libel 
Coming as they did from England and its legal 
structure, the colonies’ recognition of a common-law cause of 
action for defamation is not surprising. The use of libel and 
slander lawsuits was apparently seen as a safety valve to 
prevent the eruption of violence and conflict within what was 
  
peacefully settle dignitary conflicts ex post with the aid of juries that will determine 
and apply local community norms. 
 153 Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State 
Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are 
Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 45-46 (2008). 
 154 Of course, because these interests were not connected to any explicit cause 
of action, fewer of them were likely pleaded than might have been warranted. The 
point is that plaintiffs did successfully sue for injuries on the outer edge of the 
“reputation” interest that would have been more accurately described as dignitary 
interests in privacy or emotional tranquility had those causes of action been articulated 
at the time. See, e.g., infra notes 193-94, 203 and accompanying text. 
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still a community of pioneers.155 Thus, in the typical civil 
defamation suit of the time, the plaintiff and defendant knew 
each other, and both were known to the jurors. “People almost 
always handled their own cases, and courts applied flexible 
rules that in many ways resembled the practices of local and 
church tribunals of medieval England more than the 
complicated doctrines and procedures of modern defamation 
law.”156 Money damages were usually small and were often 
replaced or supplemented with public apologies or 
acknowledgment of wrongdoing.157 The goal was “to minimize 
feelings of hostility and ‘to make a balance’ between the 
parties.”158 Civil libel suits that resolved “small” conflicts 
between private individuals were valued by the colonists as a 
means of restoring the community norm of “harmony and 
cooperation,” much valued by people who had left England in 
part to opt out of “wrenching economic and social change” 
there.159 For instance, one Merrill sued for slander a New 
Hampshire man who asked a neighbor: “What will Merrill do 
next? Kimball has had his barn burnt, and Hoit will have his 
burnt within a fortnight. We know persons about here bad 
enough to do this[.]”160 This example shows that civil lawsuits 
were considered an appropriate means for community members 
to weigh in on the acceptable boundaries of gossip and 
speculation over local affairs among neighbors.  
By the early 1800s, politicians began bringing civil libel 
suits.161 Dramatic changes in the average newspaper also 
multiplied the number and types of speech injuries at issue in 
defamation cases:  
[The so-called popular press] added corps of ambitious reporters to 
dig out stories of everyday tragedy and triumph, introduced regular 
sports columns to hold the attention of male readers, and added 
features on domestic life to attract a loyal corps of female customers. 
Newer technologies eventually allowed for inexpensive reproduction 
of photographs, an innovation that helped bring immigrants with 
few or no reading skills in English into the reading public. And new 
  
 155 NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 16 (1986). 
 156 Id.  
 157 Id. 
 158 Id.  
 159 Id. at 22-23. 
 160 Merrill v. Peaslee, 17 N.H. 540, 540 (1845); see also Chaddock v. Briggs, 13 
Mass. 248, 250-51 (1816) (remarking that a local minister had engaged in a “drunken 
frolic” was cause for a slander suit by the minister). 
 161 ROSENBERG, supra note 155, at 121. 
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styles of story construction made newspaper reading easier for 
everyone. James Scripps, for example, believed that a good paper 
could be measured by the number of stories, preferably brief ones, 
that it contained; the more items that could be crammed into a 
single issue, the better the paper. Of course, this practice, by itself, 
increased the possibility for libel suits. The colorful content of 
popular journalism created more than the chance for greater 
numbers of libel suits; it also produced new types of defamation 
cases. By opening all kinds of areas of hitherto private life, including 
family affairs and sexual morality, to constant newspaper scrutiny, 
the popular press sought to expand the definition of what issues 
were in the public domain. Carried to its logical conclusion, popular 
journalism on the marketplace model implied that whatever 
appeared in the papers—and was purchased by the sovereign 
readers—was a public matter. But plaintiffs who were not public 
people in the traditional sense . . . did not always accept marketplace 
logic. If they . . . sued for libel, their suits could raise . . . tricky 
public-private distinctions . . . .162  
In fact, libel suits began to mushroom with the rise of 
the popular press. The New York Herald, for instance, 
completed a study in 1869, which found that the press had, 
“recent[ly],” been sued more than 700 times.163 Predictably, 
several of these suits eventually reached the Supreme Court. 
Whether the Court ultimately ruled for or against the press, 
the fact that it did not hesitate to apply the state common law 
of defamation to the facts at hand implies that the common-law 
adjudication of libel and slander cases was not seen as 
inconsistent with the First Amendment Press Clause.164 For 
instance, in Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, the Court 
reversed and remanded a libel case against the Washington 
Post brought by a local socialite.165 The paper reported that the 
plaintiff had a “nervous breakdown as a result of the tragedy at 
his home, Merry Mills, . . . when he shot and killed John 
Gillard, while the latter was abusing his wife, who had taken 
refuge at . . . Chaloner’s home.”166 The Court found that the jury 
instructions were erroneous because they directed the jury that 
the report was libelous per se, rather than allowing the jury to 
weigh the meaning of the complained-of words in context.167 
Mention of any First Amendment protection from tort liability 
  
 162 Id. at 186-87. 
 163 Id. at 197.  
 164 See, e.g., Wash. Post Co. v. Chaloner, 250 U.S. 290 (1919); Peck v. Tribune 
Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909). 
 165 250 U.S. at 291, 294. 
 166 Id. at 291 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 167 Id. at 293. 
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for the newspaper is conspicuously absent. A similar analysis 
applies to Peck v. Tribune Co., where the reversal in plaintiff’s 
favor was premised on the finding that her reputation was 
compromised by an advertisement falsely stating that she 
endorsed whisky as a medicinal tool.168 The Court focused 
entirely on the elements of the tort cause of action, without 
considering any role for the First Amendment.169  
ii. Invasion of Privacy 
Colonial courts did not embrace a freestanding tort for 
invasion of privacy. Occasionally, however, they did protect 
privacy interests even without the benefit of a developed tort 
cause of action. Early New England courts allowed suits 
against defendants who “[bore tales] from house to house.”170 As 
early as 1661, there is evidence of “antigossip” litigation in the 
Connecticut colony.171 In 1668, a Plymouth litigant “succeeded 
in having the court admonish three persons ‘for opening a 
certaine box in his house, wherin were his writings.’”172 In dicta, 
courts recognized the right to privacy as early as 1769, 
observing that “[every man] has certainly a right to judge 
whether he will make [his own sentiments] public.”173 And, 
notably, it appears that colonists seeking to vindicate privacy 
interests in the absence of explicit torts for their invasion 
regularly turned to defamation as a vehicle.174  
After the ratification, as the rise of the penny press led 
to a new news product, replete with photographs, “sob sister” 
columns, and sensational crime stories, more Americans found 
themselves the subject of news coverage.175 The number of 
“defamation” cases that were filed based on unwanted exposure 
  
 168 214 U.S. at 189-90. 
 169 Id. 
 170 DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 105 (1967) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 171 Id. at 105 n.60.  
 172 Id. at 119.  
 173 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 198 n.2.  
 174 FLAHERTY, supra note 170, at 248. Some have ventured that “[p]rivacy as 
an all-encompassing constitutional right was . . . not a part of the legal tradition 
inherited from England by the colonies which would have been secured in either a state 
or federal bill of rights.” Caplan, supra note 56, at 267 (footnote omitted). But, of 
course, the fact that privacy may have been recognized as an individual right of less-
than-constitutional weight does not disqualify it from status as a Ninth Amendment 
“right retained.” 
 175 See ROSENBERG, supra note 155, at 186-87; see also supra notes 162-63 and 
accompanying text. 
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rather than a classic diminishment of reputation rose 
accordingly. Some examples of nonreputational fact patterns 
that led to findings of defamation beginning before the turn of 
the century include: stating that a man’s “sister had been 
arrested for larceny,” running an advertisement in which a 
known teetotaler was depicted as endorsing alcohol, running an 
advertisement in which an athlete was depicted as endorsing 
chocolate, or running a picture of a wrestler next to one “of a 
gorilla in an article on evolution.”176 Plaintiff victories suggest 
that in all of these cases the courts were responding to injuries 
that did not exactly diminish reputation—an athlete would not 
be reviled by the community for a food endorsement—but were 
nevertheless real—his identity was usurped by a third party for 
commercial purposes without his consent.177  
An early response to the perceived overreaching of the 
modern press was a renowned law review article, The Right to 
Privacy, published in 1890 by Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis.178 On the heels of the groundbreaking proposal that 
courts should recognize privacy as a freestanding right 
belonging to individuals and redressable in tort, rather than as 
an offshoot of property or contract law, many common-law 
courts began to recognize various species of privacy torts.179  
While the development of a distinct law of privacy solved 
the problem of these claims masquerading as defamation, it 
introduced the problem of defamation claims seeking refuge in 
the privacy torts.180 That a given fact pattern may be just as 
reasonably classified as defamation as invasion of privacy 
follows from the fact that American law strives—likely because 
of its outgrowth from English law rather than civil law—to 
maintain the two torts as distinct when in fact they address 
  
 176 Wade, supra note 10, at 1094-95 n.11 (citations omitted).  
 177 See, e.g., Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 1892, 1907 (1981). 
 178 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130. 
 179 As the law developed, a “complex of four” privacy torts emerged: “intrusion 
upon . . . seclusion or . . . private affairs”; “public disclosure of embarrassing facts”; 
“false light”; and “[misa]ppropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.” Wade, supra 
note 10, at 1095 n.13 (quoting William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 
(1960)). Misappropriation of name or image has in recent years shifted from the 
common law to the statutory realm, with most statutes providing statutory damages 
for unconsented use of personality elements if the plaintiff cannot prove consequential 
damages. See, e.g., Aubrie Hicks, Note, The Right to Publicity After Death: Postmortem 
Personality Rights in Washington in the Wake of Experience Hendrix v. 
Hendrixlicensing.org, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 275, 276 (2012). This evolution suggests 
that one branch of privacy law, at least, has reintegrated some elements of property 
and contract. 
 180 Wade, supra note 10, at 1095.  
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similar defendant behavior and protect plaintiff interests that 
are so infinitesimally different as to be essentially inextricable.181 
Notably, the Court in Peck v. Tribune Co. did not foreclose the 
possibility of permitting the plaintiff to recover for the 
unconsented use of her photograph in a whisky advertisement, 
known in modern parlance as the right of publicity subset of the 
privacy tort.182 The plaintiff had pleaded both causes, and the 
Court reversed the dismissal of her defamation count without 
holding that the privacy count was untenable as a matter of law.183 
iii. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Just as privacy interests evolved from covert to overt 
treatment in the American common law, scholars writing early 
in the twentieth century demonstrated that courts often evaded 
the confines of tort law to compensate egregiously inflicted 
mental anguish well before formally acknowledging these 
interests in a specific tort.  
There is little documentation that courts vindicated 
claims of emotional distress through defamation or other 
avenues at the time of the ratification. However, by 1890, 
Warren and Brandeis reported matter-of-factly that “the legal 
value of ‘feelings’ is now generally recognized,” whether as 
damages parasitic to a physical injury, damages to a parent 
stemming from tort injuries to a child, or as a subset of 
defamation damages.184 Despite discernible patterns among the 
cases where emotional injury was compensated, the injuries 
were not yet categorized as a separate tort because they were 
thought not to bear sufficiently “distinct and definite features 
of [their] own.”185  
In the 1936 article often credited as the springboard for 
the American tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
  
 181 For instance, truth is a defense to a complaint for defamation but not to 
most privacy causes of action. See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from 
Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 
CALIF. L. REV. 935, 958-59 (1968). Further, a defamatory statement must lower the 
plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of the community, whereas a privacy invasion turns on 
offense reasonably felt by the plaintiff himself. See id. Historically, defamation law 
treated written and spoken statements differently, see, e.g., Tilley, supra note 76, 
passim, whereas privacy law generally does not distinguish between statements based 
on the mechanics of communication. 
 182 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909). 
 183 Id. at 188, 190. 
 184 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 197-98 n.1.  
 185 Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra note 16, at 40 (arguing that the cause 
had become sufficiently distinct to warrant independent treatment). 
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Calvert Magruder demonstrated that when necessary, courts 
compensated emotional injuries behind the fig leaf of other 
torts.186 So, for instance, where a hospital patient had to wait 
eleven hours to be discharged because of an unpaid bill, the 
court called it false imprisonment and compensated him; where 
a railroad conductor failed to stop a drunken passenger from 
kissing a female passenger, the court found the company liable; 
where speech mortified plaintiffs even though hearers did not 
believe its contents, courts were known to call it defamation 
and give a verdict.187  
Magruder, later joined by William Prosser, argued that 
courts should accord “independent legal protection” for “the 
interest in mental and emotional peace” via a new tort.188 
Magruder summarized the types of conduct that judges had 
been compensating sub rosa or wringing their hands and 
rejecting, proposing that these behavioral patterns should be 
the province of this new cause of action. The patterns included: 
publicly accusing a woman of unchastity;189 insulting treatment 
of customers in public places of business such as shops, 
telegraph offices, or railway cars;190 falsely circulating reports 
that a school child was illegitimate;191 public posters identifying 
debtors;192 unfounded attempts to sue and harassment in the 
course of bill collection;193 and “mishandling of corpses.”194  
Of course, these fact patterns are almost identical to 
those found in the Roman law of iniuria summarized in Part 
IV.A.2.195 By 1948, the American Law Institute announced in a 
supplement to its first Restatement of Torts that an 
  
 186 See Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of 
Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1034 (1936). 
 187 Id. at 1034-35 & nn.5, 8 & 9.  
 188 Id. at 1035.  
 189 Id. at 1051. 
 190 Id. at 1052-53. 
 191 Id. at 1059. 
 192 Id. at 1060. 
 193 Id. at 1063. 
 194 Id. at 1064; see also Zipursky, supra note 34, at 502-03 (summarizing 
classic cases via Prosser).  
 195 Surprisingly, though Magruder acknowledges the “deep human feelings 
involved” in many of these circumstances, he did not indicate any historical basis for 
the creation of the “new” tort. See Magruder, supra note 187, at 1066-67. Nor did 
Prosser or any other law professors advocating for the tort credit its Roman law 
forerunner. It is unclear why these scholars, steeped in tort history and theory, did not 
acknowledge the debt owed to Roman law. One turn-of-the century survey of American 
law schools summarized that “Roman law [has] almost disappeared from the law school 
curriculum, even as an educational and academic subject,” which may explain the 
silence. THE ROMAN LAW READER, supra note 99, at 222. 
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independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
had been fully enough developed to merit recognition.196  
In sum, all the dignitary rights and the corollary rights 
to sue for their invasion have a deep, nearly atavistic lineage 
within Western legal culture. As one scholar has summarized 
their history:  
We have interests in mental tranquility, in reputation, in 
privacy. . . . The recognition of all these things as interests presumably 
took place over millennia. They are now part of our evolved selves. . . . 
Gradually, recognized interests undergo a metamorphosis into a 
recognition of rights. . . . As society evolves, it establishes various 
instruments through which these rights are announced and 
sometimes advertised. One of these, a constantly developing repository 
of rights, is the common law.197 
V. THE STATUS OF DIGNITARY TORTS AS NINTH 
AMENDMENT “RIGHTS RETAINED”  
Under the modest Ninth Amendment “rule of 
construction” theory, enumerated rights do not automatically 
trump retained rights when the two clash merely because the 
former are enumerated. Instead, courts interpreting the reach 
of enumerated rights must attempt to calibrate their reading of 
the enumerated right to avoid crowding out the right retained. 
Applying this theory, this section considers how well each of 
the dignitary torts—defamation, intentional infliction, and 
invasion of privacy—fits within each of the “rights retained” 
models—Framers’ original public understanding of natural-law 
rights, “Western-legal-tradition” rights, 1791 state-law rights, 
and post-1791 state-law rights. It concludes that defamation 
indisputably fits within all four models; invasion of privacy fits 
within at least the Western-legal-tradition and post-1791 
models, and possibly the natural-law and 1791 models; and 
intentional infliction also clearly fits within at least the 
Western-legal-tradition and post-1791 models, and possibly the 
natural-law model. 
  
 196 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948). State courts throughout 
the country shifted from an implicit to an explicit recognition of the IIED tort over the 
forty-year period from 1939 through 1979. See, e.g., Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Defense 
Against Outrage and the Perils of Parasitic Torts, 45 GA. L. REV. 107, 135-36 (2010) 
(describing history of IIED adoption in American courts and the tort’s current status as 
the “majority rule”).  
 197 MARSHALL SHAPO, AN INJURY LAW CONSTITUTION 37-38 (2012). 
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A. Dignitary Interests as “Natural-Law” Rights as 
Understood by the Framers 
1. Defamation 
The status of a right to reputation as a natural-law 
right is virtually indisputable. Even applying the most 
restrictive Ninth Amendment definition of natural-law rights, 
those identified by Locke and Blackstone, one sees uniform 
textual agreement that men have a right to protect their 
reputations against incursions by private parties. As outlined 
in Part IV.B.2, Locke explicitly wrote that natural law 
prohibited individuals from speech that would harm “[an]other 
person’s reputation.”198 Blackstone’s Commentaries, too, 
explicitly state that man’s absolute right to personal security 
included an “uninterrupted enjoyment of his . . . reputation.”199  
2. Privacy 
There is less support within Blackstone and Locke for 
the proposition that privacy is among the individual rights 
retained under the Ninth Amendment, though the concepts do 
appear. Locke’s view that men have an “ownership interest” in 
their own “personhood”200 presages the work of Warren and 
Brandeis describing longstanding judicial intuition that the 
law should protect a party’s name and image from third-party 
co-opting without consent, whether as an element of property 
law or, eventually, as a freestanding tort. Locke’s admonition 
against “meddl[ing] with other people’s affairs”201 further 
reflects a recognition of an individual zone that should be free 
from scrutiny. Similarly, Blackstone’s identification of 
“personal security” and “personal liberty” as absolute rights 
has been interpreted by some courts as approval of private tort 
actions for invasions of privacy.202  
  
 198 LOCKE, supra note 137, at 196. 
 199 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 140, at *138 (discussed in Kent, supra note 141). 
 200 Wilkinson, supra note 136, at 284. 
 201 See LOCKE, supra note 137, at 195-96. 
 202 Kent, supra note 141, at 12 (citing Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 
S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905)). 
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3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Although neither Blackstone nor Locke make explicit 
textual reference to a private-law right of emotional 
tranquility, which is today protected by the IIED tort, their 
works clearly imply that this interest is a dimension of the 
natural-law rights of man. First, Locke focused on the 
“inherent dignity” of the individual and suggested that this 
right cast a long legal shadow. Thus, it is no surprise that he 
determined that natural law governed “intercourse among men 
and in communal life” and barred speech that would inflict 
harm not just on a person’s reputation—a version of self used 
in external exchanges—but also on his “character,” a more 
private version of self that encompasses emotion, self-image, 
and self-worth derived not internally but from external social 
assessments.203 Similarly, Blackstone’s references to “personal 
security” and “personal liberty” have also been interpreted to 
extend a right to enjoy “the general functioning of society in a 
quiet and peaceable manner,” which arguably encompasses the 
right to be free from emotional harassment inflicted via social 
interactions.  
B. Dignitary Interests as Natural-Law “Western-Legal-
Tradition” Rights 
1. Defamation 
The fact that Greece, Rome, and England all recognized 
a right to reputation enforceable against private parties 
fortifies the conclusion that reputation is among the “rights 
retained” under the individual rights theory.204  
2. Privacy 
Privacy, too, has been protected as a private right 
throughout Western legal traditions, albeit less assertively. 
The most well-developed privacy tort is found in Rome, where 
iniuria explicitly allowed private actions for invasions of 
privacy. There is less evidence of privacy protection in the 
ancient law of Greece and the early regimes in the civil-law 
  
 203 See Post, Privacy, supra note 7, at 962-63 (quoting Goffman on the theory 
that violations of social deference rules can injure the personality and inhibit “the 
complete man”). 
 204 See supra Part IV. 
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countries. In England, privacy has not been recognized as a 
right protected by a common-law cause of action. Of the three 
dignitary torts, privacy has the weakest claim to natural-law 
status under the historical theory of natural-law rights. 
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The protection of emotional well-being against 
onslaught from private actors is entrenched in centuries of 
Western legal tradition. In ancient Greece, Aristotle wrote that 
abuse and insult should be the subject of civil litigation rather 
than interpersonal violence,205 and the Code of Solon barred the 
use of harsh words in places of solace and the incitement of 
families by speaking ill of the dead.206 Rome’s law of intentional 
infliction was even more developed, allowing actions for 
defiling dead bodies or graves, harassment of debtors, sexual 
aggression, and the use of abusive language.207 Early Anglo-
Saxon law was consistent with its continental counterparts, 
recognizing causes of action for words and gestures that led to 
“humiliation.”208 Later, emotional well-being as a private-law 
right was orphaned when England transitioned from manorial 
and ecclesiastical courts to a system of common-law writs. This 
development does not significantly alter the place of the 
interest within the Western legal scheme, however, for two 
reasons. First, it was the result of historical accident209 rather 
than considered analysis. Second, the tort has reemerged in 
English common law this century, demonstrating that it 
represents persistent and deep-seated Western legal values.  
  
 205 Madden, supra note 65, at 883 (quoting ARISTOTLE, supra note 70, at 402). 
 206 See VERSTEEG, supra note 67, at 254; Lisby, supra note 75, at 442-43.  
 207 See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.  
 208 See GRIFFITHS, supra note 103, at 36 n.22. To be sure, English law formally 
departed from this tenet of Western law for a time. As the common-law courts 
developed during the Elizabethan period, they took jurisdiction over defamation and 
the protection of reputation, leaving “insult” cases to the local manorial courts. Those 
courts fell into disuse as England evolved from an agrarian to an industrial society. 
However, by 1897, the English courts began to reintegrate emotional injury into the 
tort scheme. See Réaume, supra note 123, at 66-67.  
 209 See supra notes 118-24.  
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C. Dignitary Interests as State Rights in 1791 
1. Defamation 
Colonial courts recognized private lawsuits for slander 
and libel, and colonists seeking to resolve disputes that 
interfered with community harmony frequently pursued 
them.210 The right to reputation was recognized in the laws of 
the people of the states at the time of ratification and often was 
explicitly called for in state constitutions.211 In short, “On any 
plausible reading of the Ninth Amendment, the right to 
reputation falls among the ‘others retained by the people’” 
under 1791 state law.212 
2. Privacy 
Tort actions for invasion of privacy were not explicitly 
found in the statutes or constitutions of the states at the time 
of ratification. Nor did the common law overtly recognize 
privacy causes of action. There is evidence, however, that 
colonists asserted privacy causes of actions in the seventeenth 
century.213 For example, some colonies entertained “antigossip” 
cases, while others censured defendants who opened containers 
in order to read writings not meant to be public.214 And in the 
eighteenth century, courts were known to observe in dicta the 
intuition that individuals were in sole control of how far they 
wished to thrust themselves into the public eye.215 Further, 
litigants protesting speech that unwillingly exposed them to 
neighbors took refuge in the established torts of slander and 
libel.216 Privacy has a strong claim of recognition under state 
law of 1791. 
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Historical evidence suggests that neither colonial courts 
nor state statutory or common law at the time of the 
ratification recognized a distinct tort for outrage or intentional 
  
 210 See supra notes 158-60.  
 211 See Claus, supra note 43, at 617 n.101; Tilley, supra note 76, at 1054 n.251; 
see also supra notes 151-53. 
 212 See Claus, supra note 43, at 617. 
 213 See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.  
 214 See supra notes 172-73.  
 215 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 198 n.2; supra note 175.  
 216 See supra note 176. 
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infliction of emotional distress. Of course, given the 
interrelationship between reputation, dignity, and emotional 
tranquility, there is a possibility that courts adjudicating 
common-law slander and libel claims at the time used that 
vehicle to account for emotional injury. But there is little 
documentation that courts were vindicating emotional distress 
claims. Notably, the substantial early twentieth century 
scholarship supporting the initiation of the IIED cause of action 
found just this “gaming” of the available torts in its surveys of 
common law.217 The earliest of those cases are traced back only to 
the mid-nineteenth century, however, well after ratification. 
Whether writers did not research back through the late 1700s, 
or whether they did so and unearthed no examples of “hidden” 
emotional distress claims is not clear. At any rate, intentional 
infliction does not appear to have Ninth Amendment status as a 
right protected by the common law in 1791. 
D. Dignitary Interests as State Rights Between 1791 and 
1964 
1. Defamation 
As outlined above, tort causes of action to protect 
reputation were well-recognized at the time of ratification. In the 
years between ratification and the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the majority of states drafted explicit protection for 
some type of libel in their constitutions. These tort causes of 
action continued to thrive for the two centuries until the Court 
constitutionalized the tort in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.218  
2. Privacy 
Some colonies appeared to protect privacy interests 
without explicitly recognizing privacy torts. By 1890, however, 
the proliferation of cameras and the rise of the penny press, 
with its emphasis on sensational coverage of average 
individuals, led to a push for privacy torts.219 Warren and 
Brandeis’s renowned article, The Right to Privacy, urged courts 
to develop tort causes of action for invasion of privacy, rather 
than bend the defamation tort or property-law concepts to 
  
 217 See, e.g., Magruder, supra note 187, at 1034-35. 
 218 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  
 219 See supra notes 180-81.  
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protect this dignitary interest.220 By 1964, the privacy torts had 
been described as having been “well established in the United 
States for a number of years now.”221 
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The development of the intentional infliction tort 
followed a pattern remarkably similar to the privacy torts. In 
fact, in their piece advocating privacy torts, Warren and 
Brandeis noted that despite technical restrictions on tort 
recovery for emotional harm, “the legal value of ‘feelings’” was 
generally recognized by 1890. Just as courts wishing to protect 
privacy interests before the advent of the privacy torts used 
defamation as a vehicle, courts wishing to protect emotional 
tranquility interests used the same tool, along with the concept 
of parasitic damages and bystander damages, to allow recovery 
for non-physical injuries that were linked (however tenuously) 
to a physical harm.222 In 1936, the first of a series of law review 
articles urged overt recognition of a tort for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and by 1948, the American Law 
Institute in a supplement to the Restatement of Torts, had 
complied. A number of state courts had already recognized the 
tort, and they continued to do so over the next several 
decades.223 Consequently, the tort was widely, though not 
uniformly, accepted throughout the states as part of the 
common law prior to 1964. 
E. Summary of Dignitary Tort Status Under Ninth 
Amendment Theories  
Surveying the history of the dignitary torts from ancient 
Western-law regimes through the colonial period, the 
ratification, and up through the mid-twentieth century, it 
appears that each of these torts succeeds under at least one of 
the theories for filling the Ninth Amendment set of “rights 
retained.” Respect for the right to reputation, limits on 
exposure to the public world, and emotional tranquility are 
  
 220 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 203-05.  
 221 Wade, supra note 10, at 1094. Not surprisingly, given the unitary dignitary 
interest from which the privacy and defamation torts arose, courts that had protected 
privacy by application of defamation law now began to protect reputation by 
application of the privacy torts when the particular requirements of defamation would 
have left a plaintiff unprotected. Id. at 1095.  
 222 See supra notes 186-87. 
 223 Givelber, supra note 11, at 43 nn.8-9. 
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consistent hallmarks of Western legal systems, from ancient 
Roman and Greek law, through civil law in Europe and early 
Anglo-Saxon law. English common law inadvertently 
suppressed legal vindication of these rights in the medieval 
and Elizabethan eras, but their eventual reemergence in the 
modern era shows that the cultural value attached to these 
rights is deep-seated within Western law. American law, too, 
has long honored the reputational interest and, after 
vindicating privacy and emotional tranquility rights via 
defamation for decades, has returned to the system established 
by Roman law to allow compensation for all three interests. 
This history supports the argument that privacy and emotional 
tranquility may be identified among the rights retained by the 
Ninth Amendment under an individual rights theory. Under 
the natural-law theory of “rights retained,” it is indisputable 
that the right to vindicate reputation via defamation is a right 
retained. Further, Locke’s and Blackstone’s writings suggest—
certainly less overtly—a recognition of individual rights to 
emotional tranquility and some measure of control over 
exposure to the outside world.  
Under a 1791 state-rights theory, it is again 
indisputable that the right to reputation vindicated via the 
defamation torts is a right retained. Slander and libel were 
well-recognized common-law causes of action at the time of 
ratification and were often acknowledged in state constitutions. 
Less certain, but not beyond question, is the argument that 
privacy may have been among the rights recognized by the 
common law in 1791. Although no explicit privacy cause of 
action existed in tort until the twentieth century, there is 
ample evidence that colonial courts, and those after the 
ratification, strove to protect privacy through the torts 
available at the time, primarily defamation. In contrast, there 
is very little evidence that colonial courts or those at the time 
of ratification viewed emotional tranquility as a right meriting 
overt or even covert protection in tort. In fact, emotional harm 
was considered too speculative to support damages in tort. 
Thus, under the originalist state-rights theory of the Ninth 
Amendment, it is unlikely that the right to emotional well-
being is among the “rights retained.”224 
  
 224 The disconnect between the “natural-law” status of intentional infliction 
and the 1791 status of intentional infliction can be chalked up to historical accident. 
The cause of action had been recognized for centuries, was peeled off from defamation 
during intramural jurisdictional battles in England as the legal system there cycled 
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Under an “evolving” state-rights theory, including 
among “rights retained” those adopted by state statute or 
common law after the ratification, all three dignitary torts 
would have constitutional status under the Ninth Amendment. 
Defamation, of course, had longstanding roots within English 
and American law. By the early twentieth century, state courts 
had followed the lead of Warren and Brandeis and developed 
extensive tort theories to protect privacy. And shortly 
thereafter, courts began to embrace the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress to allow money damages for 
purely non-physical emotional harms. These two latter-day 
American torts were well-established throughout the country 
by 1964, when the Court initially began to apply the First 
Amendment to cabin the dignitary tort of defamation.  
This article is agnostic as to which of these theories 
should fill the empty set of “rights retained,” in part because 
the theories seem to be different in formulation but nearly 
identical in result. In fact, concepts of “natural law,” “common 
law,” and “history and tradition” often seem interchangeable. 
As a matter of theory, there may be principled distinctions 
between the different sets of law, but for purposes of finding a 
constitutional foothold for the dignitary torts, any or all of 
them will suffice.  
Indeed, this has been a faint but consistent suggestion 
from the time of ratification through the modern era of the 
First Amendment. One of the first drafts of what eventually 
became the Ninth Amendment, crafted by Roger Sherman of 
Connecticut, states that:  
The people have certain natural rights which are retained by them 
when they enter Society, Such are the rights of Conscience in 
matters of religion; of acquiring property and of pursuing happiness 
& Safety; of Speaking, writing and publishing their Sentiments with 
decency and freedom . . . . Of these rights therefore they Shall not be 
deprived by the Government of the united States.225  
That one of the primary contributors of the Ninth 
Amendment specifically noted—in a draft of the precise 
amendment that, this article argues, governs construction of 
  
through ecclesiastical, manorial, and common-law courts, and eventually made its way 
back into both English common law and American common law. That it was “out of 
vogue” in 1791 should not alter its Ninth Amendment status when it fits under the 
other two theories for filling the “rights retained” set. See, e.g., supra notes 113-25 and 
accompanying text.  
 225 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE 
NINTH AMENDMENT app. A, at 351 (Randy Barnett ed., 1989) (emphasis added). 
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the speech right when it clashes with dignitary interests—an 
internal limitation on the speech rights conferred by the 
government suggests that the Ninth Amendment has always 
provided a structural foothold for the dignitary torts within the 
constitutional scheme. 
This view was reasserted as recently as 1965, when the 
Court was just beginning the constitutionalization of the 
defamation tort. In Rosenblatt v. Baer, where the Court held 
that the government-employed operator of a municipal 
recreation area was subject to the scrutiny provided for public 
officials in Sullivan, Justice Stewart’s concurrence pointed to 
the Ninth Amendment as a structural counterweight to the 
First when speech and dignitary interests clash: 
It is a fallacy . . . to assume that the First Amendment is the only 
guidepost in the area of state defamation laws. It is not. . . . The right of 
a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion 
and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the 
essential dignity and worth of every human being—a concept at the 
root of any decent system of ordered liberty. The protection of private 
personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the 
individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. . . . [T]his 
does not mean that the right is entitled to any less recognition by this 
Court as a basic of our constitutional system.226 
The dignitary torts are—under more than one theory of 
Ninth Amendment rights retained—entitled to some 
consideration within the constitutional scheme. In short, they 
cannot mechanistically be subordinated to the First Amendment 
simply because they are inflicted via speech.  
VI. A NINTH AMENDMENT “COMPARATIVE IMPAIRMENT” 
TEST 
A faithful application of the Ninth Amendment requires 
that changes to the scope of the dignitary torts achieved via 
application of the First Amendment must be the product of 
constitutional balancing, and at least some consideration of the 
social values they serve. Given the ambiguous scope of the 
Ninth Amendment—prohibiting both “denial” of a right 
retained via application of another enumerated right and 
“disparagement” of a right retained—the amendment’s text 
does not dictate the balancing test that should be applied to 
resolve clashes of enumerated versus retained rights. Laurence 
  
 226 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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Claus has suggested that the text points to a “hard” version of 
the Ninth Amendment that places identifiable limits on the 
exercise of constitutional rights, and a “soft” version that sets 
up a “balancing [i]nquiry” between the retained right and the 
constitutional right.227 A “hard” Ninth Amendment, which 
would prohibit the application of any constitutional right to 
invalidate a contrary retained right—at least under a state-
rights model—essentially amounts to reverse preemption.228 
This result seems impractical and inconsistent with the intent of 
the Framers. A “soft” Ninth Amendment, however, is far easier 
to conceive and apply. In the contest of rights versus rights, 
where categorical hierarchy of enumerated rights is barred by 
the Ninth Amendment, some other tumbler must be used to sort 
the competing interests and determine which right prevails. 
This process—comparing the contrary commands given by two 
sources of law absent any textual guidance—is remarkably 
similar to the exercise undertaken by courts conducting choice of 
law inquiries. This article proposes that a relatively modern 
choice of law analysis—comparative impairment—supplies a 
neat test for prioritizing among competing enumerated and 
unenumerated-but-retained rights. Not coincidentally, one 
delegate suggested modifying the Ninth Amendment by 
replacing the word “disparage” with the word “impair,” which he 
claimed was a clearer indication of the Framers’ intent.229 
Although the proposal was rejected, it provides some insight into 
the underlying concerns of the Framers for purposes of devising 
a Ninth Amendment balancing test. 
Comparative impairment, a member of the “interest 
analysis” family of choice of law systems, proposes that every 
law has two effects—one internal and one external. When the 
laws of two states conflict, its author suggests, a court should 
identify the internal and external effects of the two laws.230 
Courts adjudicating a case with multistate elements and 
conflicting state laws should choose whichever one will, when 
applied, least impair the internal effectiveness of the competing 
law. So, for instance, in the classic example given by proponent 
William Baxter, State X has a usury statute protecting a 
  
 227 Claus, supra note 43, at 618-20. 
 228 See, e.g., Calvin Massey, The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amendment and Its 
Implications for State Constitutional Law, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1229, 1232 (1990). 
 229 Williams, supra note 39, at 517-18. 
 230 William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 17-18 (1963). 
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particular class of borrowers and State Y does not.231 In a case 
where a protected X borrower gets a loan from a Y lender, X 
law should apply. Why?  
[Applying Y law] would give maximum scope to Y’s policies but 
would seriously impair those of X. The protection X has afforded its 
borrowers probably has several consequences. Local lenders may 
make loans to the better risks within the class at the maximum legal 
rate, a rate somewhat lower than otherwise would have been 
afforded them, rather than forego entirely that segment of business. 
But another part of the protected class is denied local loans and 
therefore has an incentive to borrow outside the state. If [Y law is 
applied], . . . the purpose of the X lawmakers will be substantially 
impaired by the emergence of a flock of lenders just across the state 
line. . . . [Applying X law] affords maximum implementation of the 
policies of both states. . . . [T]he objectives of X, the borrower’s state, 
would be shielded from wholesale evasion: the nature of the 
transaction assures that prior to extending credit the lender will 
discover in most cases the borrower’s residence and in many cases 
other characteristics of membership in the protected class [and 
would decline the loan application without incurring any injury].232  
Importing this “comparative impairment” test to the 
Ninth Amendment context would achieve similar results. The 
objectives of neither the dignitary torts nor the Speech and Press 
Clauses would be categorically wiped out if the Court were to 
decide which took priority by examining the relative impairment 
on the other and choose the one that worked the lesser 
impairment in the particular circumstance.233 
  
 231 Id. at 14. 
 232 Id. at 14-15. 
 233 Granted, this approach would not give speakers bright-line guidance in 
every case ex ante. However, because the dignitary interests are treated via private, 
tort causes of action rather than via criminal statute, the speech at interest is not 
categorically prohibited. The speakers would be free to circulate their statements, but 
would be at risk of being ordered to internalize via monetary payment the externalities 
imposed by their speech if it injured a third party. Absent application of the First 
Amendment to this segment of tort law, the speaker and the injured would be in the 
same relative position as the rancher and the farmer in Coase’s notorious The Problem 
of Social Cost. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, reprinted in LAW, ECONOMICS 
AND PHILOSOPHY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION WITH APPLICATION FOR THE LAW OF TORTS 
(Mark Kuperberg & Charles Beitz eds., 1983); see also Justin Desautels-Stein, The 
Market as a Legal Concept, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 387, 450-54 (2012). Coase’s Theorem 
applies just as well to the speaker-injured scenario as it does to the rancher-farmer: left 
to their own devices (assuming the existence of dignitary torts to stand in for physical 
vengeance but removing the constitutional insulation from liability for the speaker, a 
tenable assumption given that Coase does not see the common law as state action, but 
as a predicate for bargaining, whereas application of First Amendment restrictions to 
the common law is more akin to state action), the two parties would bargain toward an 
economically efficient outcome. In the speech scenario, the likely outcome is the 
provision of insurance for speakers whose words might injure. In fact, defamation 
insurance existed at the time Sullivan was decided, although the Court did not 
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For example, in Sullivan, if the Court applied 
comparative impairment, it would have found that the internal 
effect of Alabama’s defamation law was to protect the 
reputations of its citizens from false statements. The external 
effect of the state law was to permit heavy damage awards 
against publishers, including out-of-state papers such as the 
Times, which was considered by many in the state an “outside 
agitator.”234 The internal effect of the First Amendment is to 
protect speakers from state regulation of their speech. The 
external effect of the First Amendment is to permit speech even 
when it could harm an individual’s reputation. Applying 
Alabama’s defamation law as interpreted by the state court, 
rather than applying the First Amendment in the case, would 
have achieved the law’s internal goal—protecting the 
reputation of Commissioner L.B. Sullivan235—but would have 
significantly impaired the right of the New York Times to speak 
free from state regulation. In contrast, applying the First 
Amendment to protect the Times’ ability to run an 
advertisement criticizing government officials fully realizes the 
internal goals of the enumerated right. It does not, however, 
significantly impair the internal effect of Alabama’s defamation 
law. While that law was designed to protect individual 
reputations, several of its elements were apparently not satisfied 
in the Sullivan case, the jury’s verdict notwithstanding.236 Thus, 
a comparative impairment analysis points to a preference for the 
enumerated right in this case.  
  
consider whether the market was already providing efficient protection for injurious 
speakers. Notably, defamation insurance policies continue to be sold today, primarily to 
media companies (although increasingly as riders to homeowner policies for poorly 
capitalized bloggers). This dynamic raises the interesting possibility that between the 
Constitution and the market, speech is overinsured and thus, speakers are incentivized 
to produce more injurious speech. This is a particularly dangerous problem when cross-
referenced with the diminishment of the dignitary tort recourse. 
 234 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 294 (1964). 
 235 Id. at 256.  
 236 For example, it is debatable whether Sullivan was actually “identified” in the 
advertisement. See, e.g., id. at 288-89 (expressing the Court’s view that the jury erred in 
finding that the ad, in which “[t]here was no reference to respondent . . . either by name 
or official position” was “of and concerning him” as required by Alabama law). In addition, 
the falsehoods in the advertisement were arguably immaterial, including a mistake 
regarding the song that activists sang during a university protest and a characterization 
of the police as having “rung” the campus when, in fact, they were not standing in an 
unbroken ring. See id. at 258-59. Further, a cynic might wonder whether the average 
member of the (white) community in Montgomery actually held Sullivan in lower esteem 
for taking a hard line against the civil rights activists whose efforts were not supported 
by most city residents. The Court suggested as much. See id. at 260. 
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The same comparative impairment analysis yields a 
different result in Snyder. There, the internal effect of the 
Maryland intentional infliction law was to protect individuals 
from emotional anguish inflicted by those who speak abusively 
of or disrespect the dead. The external effect of the law is to 
extract monetary payment from speakers whose words injure 
and thereby potentially chill injurious speech.237 Again, the 
internal effect of the First Amendment is to protect speakers 
from state regulation of their speech, while the external effect 
of the amendment is to permit speech even when it can inflict 
emotional anguish. Here, application of the Maryland 
intentional infliction law would have achieved its internal 
effect by vindicating the plaintiff-father for slurs about his 
deceased son that were circulating on the day of his son’s 
funeral and in perpetuity thereafter on the Internet. The 
external effect of its application would have been to require the 
funeral protesters to compensate the father for the injury their 
chosen method of protest inflicted. However, barring them ex 
ante from protesting as they wished would not be an effect of 
applying the Maryland law, so there is little impairment of the 
internal effect of the First Amendment. Had they wished to 
avoid the ex post compensation ordered by the jury, they could 
have vigorously discussed their views on the American military 
and homosexuality generally without circulating false and 
demeaning information about the plaintiff’s son, a private 
individual. In contrast, applying the First Amendment as the 
Court did achieved the First Amendment internal effect of 
protecting the protesters’ speech, but significantly impaired the 
father’s right to be made whole for the injuries the protesters 
inflicted. Thus, because application of the First Amendment 
more impairs the internal working of the IIED right retained 
than application of the right retained impairs the right to 
speech, the right retained is preferred under a “comparative 
impairment” Ninth Amendment analysis. 
One could argue that the Court’s requirement in 
Sullivan that public figures prove a speaker’s “actual malice” 
before recovering in defamation is sufficient to balance free 
speech interests against dignitary tort interests.238 Why, then, is 
  
 237 See, e.g., supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text (discussing the speech 
at issue in Snyder and the externalities of that speech imposed on the plaintiff-father).  
 238 Claus, for one, has stated that a “soft” version of the Ninth Amendment 
would require, in a defamation case, that “the interest underlying defamation law must 
be accorded its appropriate weight.” Claus, supra note 43, at 618-19. In Sullivan, the 
Court did not wipe out the Alabama cause of action for defamation altogether, and did 
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it inadequate to satisfy the demands of the Ninth Amendment? 
Most important, it fails because current speech–tort 
jurisprudence is not conducted within an acknowledged Ninth 
Amendment framework, meaning that balancing the rights of 
the individual and state to legal recourse for dignitary injuries 
against the rights of speakers is not a mandatory step in the 
analysis. Snyder, in which the Court indicated that it had no 
choice but to protect the injurious speech, illustrates the fact 
that absent a Ninth Amendment requirement to acknowledge 
and balance the “right retained,” the constitutional right can 
automatically occupy the field.239 Second, the “actual malice” test 
has been so embroidered by corollary principles that it no longer 
functions as a neutral test for sifting through the facts and 
interests represented by a particular case.240 Finally, because tort 
suits are brought by individual plaintiffs, and because the actual 
malice test inquires only into the status of the plaintiff and the 
actions of the defendant, the interests of the state in permitting 
common-law recovery for dignitary torts are not fully accounted 
for.241 The Ninth Amendment mandates a mechanism by which 
dignitary rights are weighed in such cases, and “actual malice” 
in its existing incarnation fails because it is optional and 
arguably constitutionalizes an undervaluation of the dignitary 
interests. Comparative impairment, in contrast, would be a 
mandatory test compelled by the Ninth Amendment rule of 
construction when enumerated rights clash with unenumerated-
but-retained rights. In addition, it requires articulation of the 
intended effects of the dignitary and speech laws and calculation 
  
not wipe out the New York Times’ speech rights altogether. Instead, it “narrowed 
the . . . reach of state defamation law” and employed a “limiting construction of the 
constitutional right to freedom of speech” by permitting private individuals to sue for 
defamation without the application of First Amendment guard rails, and permitting 
public figures to recover only in limited circumstances where the speaker had abused 
its free speech rights by knowingly or recklessly publishing untruths that blemished 
reputation. Id. One could interpret this as a “soft” test under which the interests 
served by Alabama defamation law were considered and assigned an “optimal” weight 
in relation to the speech rights involved. 
 239 See supra note 32 and accompanying text; see also Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. 
Ct. 1207, 1219-20 (2011). 
 240 In particular, constitutional rules that carve wide latitude for speech about 
“public figures” who have no influence on public affairs but are merely of some interest 
to the public, allowing “rhetorical hyperbole,” permitting deliberate non-material 
misquotation, shifting the burden of proof on key issues from the defendant to the 
plaintiff, taking consideration of key elements from the jury and imposing a standard 
of de novo rather than clearly erroneous review on appeal leave virtually no room to 
consider the dignitary rights of the plaintiff or the state’s interest in allowing peaceful 
recourse for dignitary injuries. See Anderson, supra note 21, at 787. 
 241 See id. at 771-74. 
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of the impairment that would result for each if the others were 
applied. This is a methodical approach that guarantees some 
valuation of dignitary interests regardless of where the speech–
dignity line is ultimately drawn in a particular case.  
CONCLUSION 
Current First Amendment theory consistently 
undervalues the role of the dignitary torts.242 If the Constitution 
incorporates a preference for speech over the right to protect 
dignitary interest, it compels this result. But if dignitary 
interests have some constitutional parity with speech rights, 
speech will not always automatically trump dignity. This 
article suggests that under the “right-versus-right” rule of 
construction theory of the Ninth Amendment, dignitary rights 
are protected from the diminishment that necessarily follows 
from an expansive reading of the First Amendment. Freed from 
constitutional compulsion to shrink dignitary torts, courts may 
take into account the social value of those torts and reassert 
them accordingly within the constitutional scheme. 
Tort law serves a crucial social goal. First and foremost, 
it offers a peaceful means of resolving private disputes. Human 
nature responds to perceived wrongs with vengeance. “Tort law 
promotes the law’s civilizing function.”243 Thus, “an imbalance 
[between tort law and speech law] could lead to . . . extralegal 
and socially dangerous self-help.”244 Indeed, news accounts 
suggest that those who are hamstrung in asserting their 
dignity interests against speech, particularly children and 
teens, may resort to self-help in the form of suicide or 
interpersonal violence.245 
  
 242 Not coincidentally, perhaps, this erosion has coincided with what some 
torts advocates describe as a certain scholarly contempt for the entire field of tort law. 
“Torts seems often to be conceived as a course that teaches students how common law 
allocates the costs of accidents,” and as a result, is viewed as “ad hoc and esoteric.” 
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 918. 
 243 Deana Pollard Sacks, Snyder v. Phelps, The Supreme Court’s Speech-Tort 
Jurisprudence, and Normative Considerations, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 193, 199 (2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 244 Id. at 194. 
 245 See, e.g., Robert D. Richards, Sex, Lies and the Internet: Balancing First 
Amendment Interests, Reputational Harm, and Privacy in the Age of Blogs and Social 
Networking Sites, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 176, 179-80 (2009) (documenting instances 
in which the inability to assert reputational interests in the face of demeaning speech 
led to self-help); see also A.G. Sulzberger, In Small Towns, Gossip Moves to Web, and 
Turns Vicious, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, at A1 (reporting that comments on Topix 
news sites in rural areas had “provoked fights and caused divorces”). In many of these 
high-profile cases, the injured could not assert dignity rights against the speaker 
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These insights apply with unique force in the subset of 
torts that compensate for lost dignity, honor, reputation, or 
well-being. Unlike other torts, where loss allocation is arguably 
the foremost goal, a money verdict is often more symbolic than 
compensatory in the dignitary torts.246 The mere fact of a verdict 
in the plaintiff’s favor, regardless of the dollar amount, can serve 
to restore the plaintiff and the defendant to the equal status 
they occupied prior to the dignity-injuring speech, thus valuing 
both speech and the interests it can harm.247 To the extent that 
American society values lower rates of interpersonal violence, 
courts and policymakers should reevaluate a constitutional 
scheme that has over the past decades significantly undermined 
the availability of the dignitary torts to peacefully vindicate 
these interests.  
  
because the speaker was anonymous. However, the impulse to self-help arguably arises 
regardless of the reason the injured is thwarted in a quest for vindication, whether it 
be inability to identify him or a legal doctrine that tells him his well-being is less 
important than the speech that harmed him. See PINKER, supra note 13, at 99 
(explaining that “retaliation after an insult” is one of the triggers for violence that 
leads to homicide). 
 246 See, e.g., Walter V. Schaefer, Defamation and the First Amendment, 52 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1, 15 (1980) (“[C]oncentration upon a money judgment as the appropriate 
remedy for defamation is a defect that has plagued the common law since it first 
undertook to substitute a legal remedy for private vengeance.”); see also THE COST OF 
LIBEL, supra note 18, at 25 (documenting that a substantial number of plaintiffs would 
have forgone tort suits if they had been offered an apology for the complained-of speech).  
 247 See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 2, at 1784 n.105 (outlining theories that tort 
law establishes expectations that injurer and injured are equals). 
